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ABSTRACT
In order to dispel the myth that repayment rates are in themselves sufficient measures of a credit
program's success, I will pursue a broader, more integrated evaluation of the socio-economic
impact of Trinidad & Tobago's sole microcredit program, FUNDAID. In addition to repayment
rates, I will examine how the loans affected the assisted enterprises, how entrepreneurial activity
impacted the lives the entrepreneurs and their households, and how the assisted businesses may
have affected members of the surrounding communities. By juxtaposing this information (54%
of loans resulted in net positive outcomes) against FUNDAID's repayment data (99% of loans
were repaid), I will argue that repayment rates alone are not an effective measure of program
success. More importantly, I will discuss the implications of the discrepancy between socio-
economic impact and repayment rates, where 45% of borrowers surveyed were forced to come up
with some other means of repaying their debts regardless of the fact that their businesses were
seriously struggling, and in many cases, had closed down altogether.
My research reveals the essential design problem involved in requiring poverty-oriented credit
programs to be fully financially sustainable. Because financial sustainability requirements force
microcredit programs to either screen out the most risky (which are often the most needy)
borrowers and to implement fail-safe loan securitization measures (which ultimately serve to
ensure repayment regardless of how the assisted businesses fair), these programs' poverty-
alleviation mandates often take a back-seat to concerns over program-level financial
sustainability. I conclude that the only way to serve both goals simultaneously would be to
compromise both of the absolute goals in hopes of achieving something of a balance between the
two. For example, instead of achieving 100% financial sustainability, programs could be
required to achieve 80% financial sustainability and to document that they are not only filling a
credit gap but achieving a net positive socio-economic impact with 80% of their loans. In order
to make such a policy-shift possible, however, donors will have to expand their evaluation
mechanisms beyond the number of loans issued and repayment rates to include broader, more
integrated measures of socio-economic impact.
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Introduction
The concept of fighting poverty by giving poor people loans revolves around the
realization that, despite numerous economic and social handicaps, the poor have been actively
engaged in a wide array of productive forms of "informal" economic activity. For the most part,
these activities are small-scale home-based, income-generating activities, but they can run the
gamut from home-based bakeries, to local corner shops, to small-scale furniture makers that
produce specialty items for major distributors (de Soto, 1989; Critchlow, 1991). By providing
these microenterprises with working capital to expand their operations, it is hoped that
microcredit programs will be able to help these self-motivated entrepreneurs increase their
earnings and improve their standard of living. Moreover. these small businesses can provide
essential services to their local communities, and some may even grow and expand, thus creating
more jobs through both direct hiring and through the stimulation of supporting industries such as
suppliers and distributors (Schmitz, 1993: Sabel, 1989). If microcredit programs are able to
reach enough people in poor communities around the world. it is thought that, over time
(particularly over the span of successive generations), they will facilitate the gradual
accumulation of wealth and begin to make an impact in the fight against poverty (Mead. 1989).
The widespread popularity of microcredit programs can not only be attributed to the fact
that they promote self-help and innovative entrepreneurial spirit but also (and perhaps more
importantly) to the fact that they provide afinancially sustainable means of fighting poverty.
Unlike income transfer or public works employment programs, microcredit programs enable
resource-constrained governments and donors to leverage significant impact from a relatively
small one-time investment. As borrowers repay their loans, the funds are channeled back into
capital accounts where they can then be re-lent to someone else. These programs even pay for
their own overhead costs which are financed by the interest charged on the loans. Given that
these programs provide a low cost, financially sustainable means of "helping the poor help
themselves," it is little wonder that they have been so widely embraced. But could this all be too
good to be true?
While there are unquestionably cases where microloans have facilitated miraculous
improvements in people's lives, there is so much variance from case to case and so many factors
come into play that it is ultimately very difficult to generalize about the degree of socio-economic
impact one can reasonably expect microcredit programs to generate. Indeed, studies have shown
that the majority of small businesses fail within the first three years and those that do succeed
require a good product or service, good management, and undying dedication on the part of the
entrepreneur. (Berlin) In fact, the degree of difficulty involved in running a business, where one
has to attend to management, marketing. financing, etc., on top of the core business activiry, is so
great that one wonders whether poor people who generally lack education and business
experience even stand a chance at surviving in a competitive marketplace (Bates, 1995: Bates
1996).
Why then have microcredit programs seen such high repayment rates, often as high as
98%? (Shorebank Advisory Services, 1994) Is this iron-clad proof that poor people can hold
their own in the marketplace or might there be some other explanation? Perhaps it is sample
bias, as only self-motivated entrepreneurial types who are most likely to succeed even approach
these programs for loans in the first place. Perhaps these programs are not really serving the
poorest of the poor. Even if they are, is it safe to assume that because a loan is repaid that the
business is doing well and the entrepreneur is prospering?
In order to answer these questions. I conducted an in-depth evaluation of the socio-
economic impact of Trinidad & Tobago's sole microcredit program, FUNDAID. While I found
unclear results with regards to self-selection bias and serving the poor, my results unquestionably
refute the notion that repayment rates are an effective measure of a microcredit program's ability
to assist client enterprises to become more profitable and to improve the entrepreneur's overall
standard of living. In fact, only half the loans evaluated were found to have had a net positive
impact on the assisted enterprises, the entrepreneurs, and the surrounding communities, and more
than a third of the assisted businesses had failed. As these results seriously call into question
some of the most basic assumptions about the effects of microcredit programs, this paper will not
only argue that a broader, more integrated approach to program evaluation is an essential
component of any microcredit program, but it will attempt to identify and comment on some of
the key issues in program design that are responsible for this program's generally poor socio-
economic impact.
Rationale
In order to justify public funding of microcredit programs, it is necessary to demonstrate
that these programs correct a market failure -- presumably a gap in existing credit markets. This
assertion is based on the logic that it makes little sense for the government to finance (at taxpayer
expense) an activity that could just as well be performed by the private sector. Indeed, in the
case of credit, it would make little sense for the government to capitalize credit programs that
would simply compete with existing private banks. That would not only waste scarce
government resources in providing duplicative services, but it would distort the private credit
market because government-capitalized programs generally operate on a break-even or non-profit
basis so they are able to undercut for-profit banks by either charging lower interest rates or
reinvesting rents in the provision of free services (such as assistance with the application process
or basic entrepreneurial training).
Microcredit programs are generally thought to meet the market-failure condition by
providing very small loans which private banks will not provide because the cost of
administering the loans exceeds the interest earned from them. While this argument may hold
true. one wonders why so few microcredit programs actually require loan applicants to submit
proof that they were unable to obtain credit through normal commercial channels (such as a letter
of rejection from a bank). While such a documentation requirement may increase transaction
costs for borrowers, it would succeed in screening out applicants who may qualify for credit from
private sources but who. for one reason or another. prefer to take advantage of government-run
microcredit programs rather than borrowing from private sector banks. Another factor to be
considered is that of "informal" credit markets such as alternating credit-and-savings
mechanisms (sou-sou's) which are quite common in Trinidad. While some informal credit
markets have been known to be highly discriminatory and to charge exorbitant interest rates, it is
not fair to assume that informal markets could not provide a viable means of market-rate credit
for the poor in some cases. Indeed, the market-failure argument would seem to justify the need
for thorough documentation of a credit gap as a precondition for government funding of
microcredit programs.
In addition to establishing the existence of a market failure, it is also important to ensure
that the long-run run benefits of funding these programs outweigh the cost to the government.
The benefits of microcredit programs could take many forms ranging from job creation and
poverty alleviation (which some might associate with a decrease in the incidence of crime) to the
stimulation of economic activity in poor areas (which might ultimately induce development and
help increase the tax base). Since one of the main reasons for the widespread popularity of
microcredit programs is their low cost (which is essentially limited to the initial investment in the
start-up capital since the funds revolve and replenish themselves over time), the key question is
whether these programs actually yield the anticipated benefits.
When considered in light of the market-failure and project-efficiency arguments, the fact
that microcredit programs have been, and continue to be, so widely replicated around the world
would seem to suggest that these programs are filling a real need in the most efficient way.'
Surprisingly, when one carefully considers the way in which these projects are implemented and
how their efficacy is measured. however, it becomes apparent that even the service-providers
themselves know very little about how these programs really affect the lives of the borrowers.
Most microcredit programs are evaluated according to the volume of loans issued and the
repayment rate because these figures are easy to measure and it is generally assumed that ability
to repay a loan is evidence that the assisted enterprise is prospering. As I found that almost half
the borrowers sampled were unable to repay their loans with funds from the assisted businesses
and they were forced to find other means of generating cash to service their debts, I will argue
Witness the recent Microcredit Awards issued by President Clinton in December, 1996 and the recent Microcredit
Summit, an international Summit held in Washington, DC in January, 1997. The microcredit Summit which was
primarily a ceremonial event marking the recognition of and commitment to fund micro-enterprise lending programs
around the world was attended by 9 heads of state and most major international donor organizations including the
World Bank, several United Nations Programs, and numerous bilateral donor agencies.
that repayment rates can ultimately hide as much information as they reveal about how the loans
have affected the assisted businesses and the entrepreneurs.
In order to dispel the myth that repayment rates are in themselves sufficient measures of a
credit program's success, I will pursue a broader, more integrated evaluation of the socio-
economic impact of Trinidad & Tobago's sole microcredit program, FUNDAID. In addition to
repayment rates, I will examine how the loans affected the assisted enterprises, how
entrepreneurial activity impacted the lives the entrepreneurs and their households, and how the
assisted businesses may have affected members of the surrounding communities. By juxtaposing
this information (54% of loans resulted in net positive outcomes) against FUNDAID's repayment
data (99% of loans were repaid). I will argue that repayment rates alone are not an effective
measure of program success. More importantly, I will discuss the implications of the
discrepancy between socio-economic impact and repayment rates, where 45% of borrowers
surveyed were forced to come up with some means of repaying their debts regardless of the fact
that their businesses were seriously struggling, and in many cases, had closed down altogether.
My research reveals the essential design problem involved in requiring poverty-oriented
credit programs to be fully financially sustainable. Because financial sustainability requirements
force microcredit programs to either screen out the most risky (which are often the most needy)
borrowers and to implement fail-safe loan securitization measures (which ultimately serve to
ensure repayment regardless of how the assisted businesses fair), these programs' poverty-
alleviation mandates often take a back-seat to concerns over program-level financial
sustainability.
Any loan as opposed to grant-based method of poverty alleviation will by nature be
plagued by an inherent conflict between the desire to achieve financial sustainability and the
desire to serve the poorest of the poor (who often require more elaborate and expensive services
than their more prosperous counterparts) and to make a concrete impact in the fight against
poverty. I will argue that it is possible for a single program to serve these competing goals, but
not in an absolute sense, for each goal directly undermines the other. It is only possible to serve
both by compromising the degree to which each individual end is achieved. That is, it is only
possible to achieve a high degree of socio-economic impact by sacrificing financial
sustainability, the very component that makes microcredit programs so popular. On the other
hand. it is only possible to achieve full financial sustainability by screening out the most needy
and paring down support services, which would essentially sacrifice the goal of poverty-
alleviation and reduce these programs to government-subsidized profit-oriented banks. The only
way to serve both goals simultaneously would be to compromise both of the absolute goals
inhopes of achieving something of a balance between the two. For example, instead of achieving
100% financial sustainability, programs could be required to achieve 80% financial sustainability
and to document that they are not only filling a credit gap but achieving a net positive socio-
economic impact with 80% of their loans. In order to make such a policy-shift possible,
however, donors will have to expand their evaluation mechanisms beyond the number of loans
issued and repayment rates to include broader, more integrated measures of socio-economic
in)act. While these outcomes are admittedly more difficult and expensive to measure than loan
issuance and repayment rates, I maintain that they are an essential tool for ensuring that
microcredit programs effectively manage the very difficult conflict between financial
sustainability and poverty-alleviation goals. The effective resolution of these competing goals is
essential to the very concept of government-sponsored poverty-oriented microcredit programs.
Source: Knight, Franklin W., and Colin A. Palmer. The Modem Caribbean. Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
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Chapter 1.
Background
A Brief Introduction to Trinidad & Tobago
Trinidad & Tobago is a twin island nation that lies just off the coast of Venezuela in the
Windward Caribbean. With a 1994 population of approximately 1.4 million people and 1994
real per capita GNP of approximately US $3,883 (1985 prices), Trinidad is classified as a
middle-income country that is primarily known for its rich oil deposits and its ethnic
heterogeneity. People of East Indian origin, originally brought to Trinidad as indentured laborers
to ease a labor shortage in the late 18('s, account for 40% of Trinidad's population, and they
still predominate in Trinidad's rural sector where they have established a strong foothold in
agriculture and agri-business. Africans, on the other hand, account for 43% of the population,
residing mainly in the highly urbanized East-West corridor in the north of the country and
accounting for the majority of the sizable civil service.' Although there is still a great deal of
friction between these two dominant ethnic groups, there has been a significant amount of inter-
mixing. and 14% of the population identify themselves as being of mixed race. Finally, a very
small proportion of the population (approximately 3%) is comprised of people of other
ethnicities ranging from indigenous Indians, to descendants of European settlers, to Chinese,
The Black domination of civil service employment is beginning to change, however. Just as the size of the Indian
population surpassed that of the Black population for the first time in history in the mid-1990's, the first Indian
Prime Minister. Basdeo Panday, was elected in February, 1996. Under his administration, there has been
considerable public debate about the alleged ousting of Black civil servants who are being replaced by Indians.
While political factionalism does tend to mirror ethnic factionalism in Trinidad, it should be noted that I did speak
with several people who did support the opposing ethnic group's party, so this racial/political divide should not be
overemphasized.
Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who came to the region in the early part of the century to
2
establish mercantile enterprises.
Aside from its ethnic heterogeneity, the factor that most deeply affected Trinidad's
development was oil. Unlike any other nation in the Caribbean, Trinidad was blessed with
bountiful deposits of crude oil which enabled the young nation to capture substantial foreign
exchange earnings that greased the wheels of progress. Earnings from oil exports enabled
Trinidad to undertake massive investments in industry, infrastructure, and social investments
such as housing, health, and education. Not only did the Williams administration establish a
national pension system very early in the young nation's history, but it established a complex
system of subsidies and transfers that acted as a social redistribution mechanism to cushion
aglainst ethnic friction and social unrest. Another key aspect of the Trinidad's nation-building
efforts was the establishment of a massive civil service which was largely comprised of educated
Blacks who formed the backbone of the Williams administration's support. Those who were not
employed directly in government posts were employed in one of the many huge (but notoriously
inefficient) state-owned enterprises which were created in an almost entirely unsuccessful effort
to diversify the nation's economic base. Finally, the distributional benefits of this oil-induced
supply-side approach to development were further maximized as widespread unionization took
hold and workers in the major industries such as oil, agriculture, and government, were able to
extract even more benefits by banding together and establishing a powerful voice in the
government's decision-making process.
While oil revenues undoubtedly gave Trinidad much-needed resources that enabled its
population to achieve a better standard of living, it can be argued that Trinidad's rich endowment
2 Trinidad & Tobago Census of Population. 1980.
of oil was both a blessing and a curse. Aside from facilitating essential productive investments,
Trinidad's oil revenues fueled a dangerous frenzy of consumer spending which ultimately left the
country with a massive debt burden when oil prices crashed in the late 1970's. Unfortunately
Trinidad's productive investments in education and infrastructure were far outweighed by a rash
of spending on expensive, imported luxury items. When the foreign exchange earnings derived
from soaring oil prices eventually dried up, the Trinidadian people, and particularly the large and
privileged bureaucratic sector, were unprepared to deal with the ensuing need to adjust to a much
lower standard of living. In fact, the large and inefficient state-owned enterprises continued to
deplete government coffers well into the 1980's, and in the absence of a diversified economic
base which might have helped to ease the balance of payments crisis, the country had no other
choice but to accept an IMF bail out.
In 1989. under the Robinson administration, Trinidad implemented a structural
adjustment program which included:
e privatization of state enterprises
" civil service reforms including:
" a 10% reduction in public sector employees' salaries
e the implementation of a Voluntary Termination of Employment Program (VTEP)
e suspension of merit increases for civil servants
" suspension of Cost of Living Allowances (COLA's) under the Old-Age Pensioner's
Program
e the imposition of a Value-Added Tax of 15% (VAT)
* continued removals of subsidies and transfers, and
" devaluation of the Trinidad & Tobago dollar on 2 occasions, 1985 and 1989.3
Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago
This dramatic restructuring of Trinidad's economy has had far-reaching effects,
particularly on the lower stratum of the country's population. A poverty report issued by the
Ministry of Social Development indicates that household expenditure levels outstripped income
levels in both 1988 and 1992. but "the general picture was that both had fallen for all classes
within the population." (See Table 1.1) At the same time, the disparity in income widened as
those in the top 10% of the income distribution saw an increase in income whereas those in the
3rd decile through the 9th saw a decrease in income. The Gini Coefficient for after tax
income/expenditure ratios also showed a slight increase from .41 in 1988 to .42 in 1992. Most
importantly. in the short span of only four years between 1988-1992, the poverty rate more than
doubled from 16.6% to 35.8 %.4
3Ministry of Social Development, The Determination and Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago:
Indications from the 1992 Survey of Living Conditions. Ministry of Social Development: Trinidad & Tobago.
September, 1996, pp. 11.
4These poverty rate figures measure the proportion of people living in households whose income falls below that
specified as the minimum income required to meet basic needs for the corresponding household size. The 1988 data
were drawn from the 1988 Household Budgetary Survey issued by the Central Statistical Office. Based on these
data, Dr. Ralph Henry of the University of the West Indies calculated a poverty rate of 18.5% while Professor Rolf
Teekens, using a slightly different methodology, calculated a poverty rate of 14.6%; I have taken the average of these
figures. The 1992 data comes from a calculation performed by the Ministry of Social Development based on data
attained from the Survey of Living Conditions, also issued by the Central Statistical Office.
Table 1.1
Distribution of income and Expenditure
Trinidad & Tobago (1992)
20 -
. .:. .. - lncome (%)
15 - . Expenditure (%)
10 -
Source: Ministry of Social Development, The Determination and Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago:
Indications from the 1992 Survey of Living Conditions. Ministry of Social Development: Trinidad & Tobago.
September 1996 Table 9 pp. 36.
The official poverty line established by the Ministry of Social Development is
TT $623 monthly per capita This figure was arved at by estimating the monthly cost of a
basket of goods necessary to meet minimum acceptable living standards (i.e. food, books,
clothing, footwear, medical supplies. lighting, fuel, toilet and household supplies, transportation
and housing).5 (See Table 1.2.)
Poor households are more likely to be African than Indian. Africans make up nearly half
of all poor households, while Indians comprise 38%, and mixed families 13%. A full 40% of
poor households are headed by a person who is either unemployed or outside of the labor force.
Approximately 1/3 of all poor households are women-headed, and of those, only 1/4 are Indian.
Female heads of poor households exhibit a higher rate of unemployment (42%) than males
(31 %). Poor African household heads are slightly more likely to be unemployed (38%) than
mixed (34%) or Indian (30%) household heads. This may in part be the higher incidence of self-
5Ibid., pp. 22, 98-101.
employment among poor Indian household heads (20% ) as compared to poor African household
heads (12%). In particular, the rate of self employment among poor Indian female heads of
household (16%) is nearly twice that of Africans (9%), but poor African female heads of
households show a slightly higher rate of participation in the formal labor force.
Table 1.2
Components of Poor Households'
Expenditures
Trinidad & Tobago (1992)
Housing
27%
Food
40%
Transportatio
n
17% Clothing Other
6%
10%
Source: Ministry of Social Development, The Determination and Measurement of
Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago: Indications from the 1992 Survey of Living Conditions.
Ministry of Social Development: Trinidad & Tobago. September. 1996. Figure 8, pp. 38.
These figures indicate that race and family structure are significant factors affecting
family income, with African and female-headed households showing the highest incidence of
poverty. They also reveal that unemployment is a significant problem but so too is working
poverty, both among the self-employed and those who have jobs in the formal labor market. (See
Table 1.3.) While 60% of poor families receive public assistance, this figure drops to a meager
18% (note that this is the share of the poor - not the total population - receiving public
assistance) after pension benefits are netted out. This would indicate that young families and
children are also in particular need of extended benefits and supplemental income.
Table 1.3
Depth of Poverty By Household Size
Trinidad & Tobago (1992)
$3,000 Poverty
Line
$2,500
$2,000 ---- MeanIncome
$1.500 of the
$1,000
$500
$0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Source: Ministry of Social Development. The Determination and Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad & Tobago: Indications from the 1992
SuIe \ of Livino Conditions. Ministry of Social Development: Trinidad & Tobago. September, 1996. Figure 5. pp. 31.
The Role of Small Business Development
in Trinidad & Tobago's Poverty Alleviation Strategy
The promotion of small and medium enterprise (SME) has been widely touted because it
not only holds the potential to alleviate poverty through income-generation and job creation. but
it also has the capacity to spurn broader economic growth as targeted firms and industries
develop and mature. Following the lead of Southeast Asia and Latin America, Trinidad &
Tobago has made a conscious effort to embrace SME's. In fact, Trinidad & Tobago has been on
the forefront of SME development efforts in the English-speaking Caribbean, being the first
Caribbean nation to enact legislation to promote SME development and, more recently, having
the most elaborate and organized SME development program. 6
6 M. Scepersaud. ILO SSE Policy and Legislation Study, October 31, 1994.
Trinidad & Tobago's Small and Medium Enterprise Development Program (SMED)
grew out of a Forum on SMED convened by the Prime Minister in October of 1994. This
conference generated a SMED task force which formulated an action plan for a coordinated
national program for small and medium enterprise development. Comprised of business,
government, NGO, and civilians representatives, this task force identified a number of key
obstacles facing small and medium enterprises in Trinidad & Tobago and recommended specific
actions to address these problems.
The Report of the Cabinet Appointed Task Force on Small and Medium Enterprise
Development issued in June of 1995 summarized the existing SMED legislation, proposed
specific actions to supplement and strengthen this legislation, identified key actors responsible
for each step. and established a time line for the implementation of the proposed actions. As an
essential first step. however, the reported outlined the following categories for classifying
SME's:
Micro Enterprises: Owner managed with less than 5
employees, annual turnover below TT $100,000 and
investment in fixed assets. except real estate up to
TT $ 100.000.
Small Business: Owner managed or employed manager
with less than 25 employees, annual turnover between
TT $100,001 and TT $750,000, and investment in fixed
assets, except real estate between TT $100,001 and
TT $300,000.
Medium Enterprises: Owner managed or employed
manager with less than 50 employees, annual turnover
between TT $750,001 and TT $6 million and investment in
fixed assets, except real estate between TT $300,001 and
TT $1.5 million.
This differentiation between micro, small, and medium enterprises is key because it
facilitates the targeting of specific programs and services to particular portions of the "SME
sector." The sector as a whole, however, is said to be dominated by the "marginalized
economic strata of the society," particularly "the rural and urban poor, women, youth, small
farmers, and the differently abled." Because SME's tend to be poorly organized and not
widely recognized or supported, this sector is thought to be a key component of the informal
sector, which the task force aims to graduate into the formal sector so that these firms might
contribute to the tax base and the broader economic devilment of the nation as a whole.7
FUNDAID plays a key role in the SMED Program by serving as the sole service provider
specifically focused on the microenterprise sector of the economy. While not an official
government agency, FUNDAID works very closely with the government sponsored Small
Business Development Company, Ltd. (SBDC), a one-stop center with 3 locations throughout
the country which provides comprehensive services and referrals to all types and sizes of SME's.
In addition to working closely with the SBDC, FUNDAID heads the Small Sector Development
Council (SSDC). a quasi-governmental steering committee that seeks to coordinate policy,
research, and service provision to small and micro-enterprises.8
An Overview of The Trinidad & Tobago Development Foundation
(FUNDAID)
FUNDAID is one of the oldest small business oriented programs in Trinidad. A non-
governmental organization, FUNDAID was established in 1973 to provide financing and
Repor. of the Cabinet Appointed Task Force on Small and Medium Enterprise Development. June, 1995.
The Small Sector Development Council of Trinidad & Tobago. Development Plan.
technical assistance to low-income individuals to start or expand income-generation projects.
Father Gerry Pantin, an outspoken leader in Trinidad & Tobago's Catholic Church, was
instrumental in starting the organization as an essential complement to SERVOL, a nationally
recognized youth training program. While SERVOL was effectively providing young people
with marketable vocational skills, many SERVOL graduates had difficulty finding jobs in the
formal sector, and they found it difficult to start their own enterprises because they lacked
management skills and access to capital. In order to address this problem, Father Pantin enlisted
the help of recognized business, government, and non-profit leaders to raise enough private
capital to establish FUNDAID. The Inter-American Foundation then provided a matching grant
of US $500,000 to assist in the establishment of the organization.
Originally, FUNDAID only financed group-based community projects such as the
construction of recreational facilities and income-generation projects. During this period,
FUNDAID didn't engage in direct lending: it only guaranteed loans made through nonnal
commercial channels and assisted community groups in organizing and implementing projects.
From 1973-1990. FUNDAID guaranteed approximately 7000 loans of this type.
In 1991. FUNDAID made a fundamental shift in the nature of its activities. After
receiving both grant and confessional loan funding on the order of US $5 million from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), FUNDAID began to engage in direct lending, and it
changed its focus from group-based to individual lending.9 While FUNDAID has not received
direct funding from the Trinidadian government, it has benefited from a limited amount of
Because all of the IDB funding has already been issued to FUNDAID, and FUNDAID is entitled to keep any
monies that are lent out and successfully repaid, FUNDAID essentially does not answer to any donor agency at this
time. While the IDB funding did require that a program evaluation he conducted, the Managing Director of
FUNDAID informed rne that no funds had been set aside for this purpose and he did not anticipate having the funds
to conduct this evaluation any time in the near future.
confessional financing and institutional capacity-building funding from the European Union
which is administered through the SBDC, a quasi-governmental agency. As the lead organizer
of the SSDC, FUNDAID is also actively involved in government efforts to establish an
integrated SMED program.
FUNDAID's central mission is to help the poor help themselves by acting as afacilitator
of beneficiary-initiated projects rather than motivating the poor to take any particular course of
action. This ideology is founded on the logic that no one knows more about how to deal with
poverty than the poor, and they are highly skilled at developing innovative strategies for
generating income and coping with the multi-dimensional problem of poverty. In an effort to
refrain from "talking down to the poor," FUNDAID does not provide any guidance about which
types of businesses clients should pursue, and it only offers very general advice about how
clients might improve the performance of their enterprises.
FUNDAID targets the most economically disadvantaged segments of the population,
particularly youth, single mothers, and the recently laid off. It makes loans anywhere from TT
$500 - TT $30.000 (US $1 = TT $5.83 as of January, 1997) for a term of up to 3 years. The
interest rate on all IDB-issued funds is 13.5 % which is approximately 2% below prime.' 0 In
rare cases. FUNDAID will grant a moratorium of up to 3 months on capital payments to allow
an enterprise to realize the fruits of an investment before it must begin to repay the loan.
FUNDAID will issue a loan for any type of project that it deems to be financially viable
except for alcohol related projects (i.e. rum shops and pubs), vehicles (other than farm-related
The Managing Director did inform me that FUNDAID is in the process of reevaluating the interest rate with the
possibility of raising it to the prime rate so as to eliminate any possible distortionary effects in the country's capital
markets.
equipment). and construction (unless the facility will exclusively house business activities)." At
one point FUNDAID also suspended loans for stock (i.e. groceries for a dry goods shop or
clothes for a boutique) because they could be easily liquidated and were often associated with
high default rates, but as of June 1996, stock loans were once again being made.
In order to qualify for a loan, applicants do not need to have a source of income or any
form of conventional collateral, but they need to find 3 people to guarantee their loan. These
guarantors can be family, friends, neighbors -- anyone who meets the established income
requirements who is willing to cosign the loan. The income requirements stipulate that the
guarantors must have been employed for a minimum of 5 years or self-employed for a minimum
of 7 years and they must be able to prove that they have enough income to cover the
installments. Guarantors must provide a letter certifying their place and period of employment
and they must submit a salary slip to verify their income. While it may be difficult for some
applicants to find 3 guarantors. FUNDAID argues that if a borrower can't find 3 people in
his/her community to support his/her venture, then he/she probably shouldn't go into business.
All guarantors are partially and wholly liable for repayment of the loan, but FUNDAID prefers to
split the payments amongst all 3 guarantors if a loan should go into default so as to minimize the
burden borne by any individual guarantor. FUNDAID guarantors differ from guarantors for
commercial bank loans in that FUNDAID only requires that they have enough income to cover
the loan installments as opposed to the full amount of the loan, and FUNDAID doesn't tie their
assets to secure the loan. Also, unlike a bank, FUNDAID encourages the guarantors to be
The Managing Director informed me that the prohibitions on these types of investments stem from IDB
regulations. Apparently there used to be a prohibition on lending for agricultural-related projects so as to avoid
duplicating the efforts of the Agricultural Development Bank, but this prohibition is no longer being enforced.
actively involved in monitoring the business operations and they invoke the help of the
guarantors in collecting from borrowers whenever they are late in making a payment.
In addition to the 3 guarantors, FUNDAID also requires that borrowers pledge either
business equipment or household items to secure the loan. Unlike banks which will only accept
security items that are less than two years old, FUNDAID will accept any item regardless of its
age or condition as long as the borrower has title to the item and has fully paid for it. FUNDAID
loan officers informed me that there is no set requirement for the number or estimated resale
value of the items pledged on any given loan; this policy is merely designed to give the borrower
an incentive to repay the loan, for if he/she defaults, he/she stands to lose the household items
pledged as security.
Because FUNDAID is a non-profit organization that operates on a very small budget, it
does not do any formal advertising. It mainly relies on media coverage, referrals from banks, the
SBDC and other non-profit service providers. and word of mouth to inform people about its
activities. While the program serves the whole country, including Tobago which is a 5 hour boat
ride away, it operates out of a single office in a small building that it recently purchased in a
dense commercial district of the capital city in Northwest Trinidad. It does however, have an
agreement with one of the main commercial banks, Republic Bank, to enable FUNDAID loan
officers to work out of various Republic Bank branch offices in the smaller cities in the more
remote areas of the country one day a week. In addition, staff in SBDC's Tobago office screen
applicants and forward documentation to FUNDAID so that Tobagonian applicants do not have
to travel all the way to Trinidad just to apply for a FUNDAID loan.
FUNDAID seldom grants the full amount that borrowers ask for. They believe that
borrowers should start small so as to minimize the initial risk, and as they become familiar with
FUNDAID's operating procedures, and as their business grows, they can come back for
subsequent loans which can increase over time. In order to ensure that borrowers use the funds
for the intended purpose, FUNDAID doesn't issue funds in cash; rather, they issue checks made
out to the suppliers of the various goods the borrower wishes to finance.
It isn't necessary to have a written business application or financial projections to apply
for a FUNDAID loan; in fact, some of FUNDAID's clients are functionally illiterate.' 2
FUNDAID simply conducts verbal interviews with potential clients and loan officers fill out the
official application materials and create simple income and expense projections based on the
information the client supplies. At the initial interview, the loan officer generally makes a
cursory evaluation of the business idea, and if it appears to be viable, he/she then informs the
client about the FUNDAID loan application process. asking him/her to return with
documentation necessary to complete the application. Necessary documentation generally
includes:
L This observation is based on conversations with the training officer and my personal observations of training
sessions where some clients could not read a passage aloud when asked to do so as part of the training exercise.
Because the education system in Trinidad is fairly good and nearly universally accessible in recent years, however,
clients with marginal literacy skills tend to be the exception rather than the rule at FUNDAID.
" Estimates/invoices for the goods/services the client wishes to finance
" Proof of ownership and letters of offerfor sale of any used goods the client wishes to purchase
" Copy of lease, title or letter of permission to operate on the premises for not less than 3 years
e Copies of any necessary business licenses (Food Badge, Food & Drug Approval, etc.)
" Copies of any advance orders for the goods or services the client intends to offer (if possible)
" Letters of recommendation from community members (if possible)
e Job letters and salary slips from not less than 3 guarantors
" List of items to be offered as security (serial numbers to be obtained via subsequent site visit)
" Certificate qf ownership and insurance of any land and/or vehicle offered as security (if applicable)
" Recent photo of applicant(s)
e Partnership agreement (if applicable)
Before completing an application, loan officers much check the client's credit rating and
conduct a site visit to inspect the business and verify the condition of the security items. The
loan officer will then prepare a 1-2 page report on the application covering the following issues:
" person(s) involved & related business experience
e business description/equity contribution
" description of product or service
e marketing strategies/contingency plan
" impact/ability to repay
" site visit/local competition
" FUNDAID assessment of creditworthiness
Applications are evaluated and decisions made within 48 hours of submission of the all the
necessary documentation. Once an application is approved, the applicant and guarantors must
come into the office to sign the loan agreement.
Before checks are issued, however, applicants are required to attend a 2-day training
session which covers basic marketing, costing, pricing, and record-keeping skills. The sessions,
taught by FUNDAID's in-house training and technical assistance officer, are held once per week
and generally involve 7-10 applicants. The sessions require only very basic literacy and
numeracy skills and they focus around specific examples from the borrowers' business
experiences. The clients are charged TT $100 for the 2 day session which covers the cost of all
materials and lunch, and coffee breaks for the 2 days. This fee is usually added into the loan
amount and paid up front to FUNDAID. If a potential borrower wished to attend the training
session prior to submitting a loan application, he/she may do that but he/she will be charged TT
$150 for the session.
After receiving a loan, applicants are supposed to receive an impromptu field visit from
a technical officer once every 3 months, but this has been difficult for FUNDAID to accomplish
due to the size of the portfolio (approximately 450 active loans), the geographic dispersion of the
borrowers, and the competing responsibilities placed on the training and technical officer. Very
recently, however, FUNDAID received funding from the European Union to hire 4 technical
officers whose only responsibility will be to pay technical assistance visits to clients. As of
January 1997, they had just hired 4 recent graduates of the University of the West Indies, all in
their early 20's. These officers would spend every Monday reviewing files and preparing
itineraries for field visits to be conducted every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. They
would then spend Fridays preparing reports on the visits conducted. These reports cover the
following:
e location
* opening & closing hours
* attitude & demeanor
e cash flow & sales
* record keeping
* loan payment
e business projections
* marketing strategies
* accounting services
* overall impression & recommendations
In order to meet their quota of 5 field visits per day spent in the field, however, the officers often
had go to many more than 5 sites to find borrowers who were home. The time spent in the field
was further constrained by the fact that the officers often had to travel to remote areas using
public transportation, and they often found it quite difficult to locate the borrowers." As a
result, the officers often had only a limited amount of time to devote to each client (usually less
than 1/2 hour) which made it exceedingly difficult to have any significant impact. In fact, one of
the four new technical officer had left her job in the space of the month that I was in Trinidad
conducting my evaluation.
" The borrowers who were behind in their payments were especially adept at evading the technical officers. I too
encountered problems locating clients who were in arrears.
In addition to training and technical assistance, FUNDAID offers its clients an
accounting service. While all clients are now required to take the service at a cost of $1000/year
which is built into the loan, very few clients actually take advantage of this service. In order to
do so, clients must implement the record keeping skills they learn in the training (which involves
keeping four separate account booklets: daily sales, weekly sales, cash ledger, and inventory),
and mail these records to FUNDAID in pre-furnished postage-paid envelopes to FUNDAID's in-
house accountant. The accountant will then generate yearly balance sheets and cash flow
statements based on the clients' records. FUNDAID's Managing Director argues that these
accounting services are vital to the long-term success of the assisted enterprises because they not
only help entrepreneurs learn to manage their business finances, but they are an essential
prerequisite to graduating to commercial financing sources. Unfortunately, most clients don't
keep records never mind sending them in, and even when clients do send in the records, they are
often not clear or complete enough to generate useful financial statements.
Almost all FUNDAID loans are backed up by SBDC (government) guarantees, and the
2% auarantee fee is added into the total loan amount. FUNDAID also offers crop insurance to
farmers who take loans for agricultural inputs for an additional fee of 2% plus and additional 6%
government tax. The total cost of borrowing from FUNDAID must then be understood in light
of the following fees:
e administrative fee (varies)
" training fee ($100)
" accounting fee ($1000/year)
" legal fee (varies)
" guarantee fee (2%)
" crop insurance fee (8%)
all of which are added to the total loan amount which is then subject to a 13.5% interest rate.
While FUNDAID was required to arrange for an impact evaluation as a condition of its
Inter-American Development Bank funding, the Managing Director of FUNDAID informed me
that no funds had been set aside for this purpose and he did not anticipate having the funds to
conduct this evaluation any time in the near future. FUNDAID's main performance measures
are published in the cumulative Summary - Loan Statistics which is updated monthly. (See
Appendix A.) The Managing Director composes an annual organizational progress report for
the Board of Directors.1 4 FUNDAID does not produce an Annual Report.
14 FUNDAID's Board of Trustees, headed by Father Gerry Pantin, consists of 25 elected members drawn from
business, the public sector and private citizens. The Board meets once monthly to review the organization's
progress.
Chapter H.
Evaluating the Socio-Economic Impact of the FUNDAID Program
FUNDAID is essentially a bank for the poor. It seeks to alleviate the problem of poverty
by giving the poor, who might otherwise lack access to credit, financing to establish or expand
their own income-generating activities. This strategy for fighting poverty is particularly
appealing because is loan rather than grant-based which opens the opportunity for financial
sustainability. In order to justify donor or government funding of such programs however, one
must first establish that the clientele served by this program are really unable to access credit
elsewhere. If these program simply duplicate services offered elsewhere rather than filling a
documented gap in the credit market, then it makes little sense to invest scarce funds in
capitalizing such programs. Even if one can establish that such programs do fill a documented
credit gap, it is still necessary to determine whether credit alone will be sufficient to assist the
beneficiaries in increasing their standard of living. Because there are many ways in which the
extension of credit for an income generating activity could impact one's quality of life, it can be
extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of credit.
This paper seeks to examine the socio-economic impact of the FUNDAID program in
order to illuminate some of the more salient issues involved in designing effective microcredit
programs for the poor. In addition to determining whether FUNDAID actually fills a credit gap
and whether it actually reaches the poor, this paper tries to ascertain what effect credit has had
on the assisted enterprises and, more importantly, on the entrepreneurs' quality of life. One way
of doing this is to try and determine whether the investments financed with the FUNDAID loans
actually caused the assisted enterprises to become more profitable. This is a particularly difficult
task. however, as the net income effect of a given investment will vary depending on the time at
which it is measured, and there are a whole range of confounding factors that make it very
difficult to attribute changes in profitability to credit alone. Furthermore, there are some cases
where the profitability takes a back seat to other more pressing concerns such as the desire to
increase assets or diversify one's income sources.
Because measuring the effects of credit on enterprise profitability is a rather imperfect
science, and because the effects of entrepreneurial activity on the entrepreneur, his/her family.
and the wider community are in some ways a more effective measure of the impact of
microcredit programs, this paper looks beyond the profitability issue to try and gauge the net
impact of credit from a variety of different perspectives: the enterprise level, the individual
level, the household level, and the community level. By examining the range of effects that
FUNDAID loans have had on all of the actors involved, I will attempt to make a very general
assessment of the overall program impact. 15 More importantly, however, I will try to understand
when and under what circumstances the program tends to work best, and I will use this
In the end, I utilized a combination of measures to determine the "impact" of the loans on the assisted enterprises
and the assisted entrepreneurial activity on the entrepreneurs, their households, and the surrounding communities.
The enterprise level indicators included whether the borrowers had access to other sources of financing, whether the
investments financed by the loans were essential, whether the investments were likely to increase enterprise
profitability, whether the borrowers were able to repay the loans, whether the assisted businesses were still in
operation, whether the enterprises were profitable, whether the borrowers had ever experienced a repayment
problem, and whether they would voluntarily repeat their decision to take the loan if they had it to do all over again.
The individual level indicators included the hours worked by the primary entrepreneur in the assisted enterprise,
whether he/she had access to other sources of personal earned income, take-home salary levels, whether the primary
entrepreneur thought he/she could make more money by being self-employed, specific occupational needs filled by
the assisted businesses, skills learned by the primary entrepreneur as a result of the assisted entrepreneurial activity
and whether the primary entrepreneur was satisfied with his/her enterprise. The effects of the entrepreneurial
activity on the household were measured by the share of houshold income derived from the assisted business. The
eflects on community members were measured by the number and salary-level of employees, services provided to the
surrounding community, and forward and backward linkages spurred by the assisted business activity. All of these
measures and the respective findings will be discussed in depth in Chapters 4 and 5.
infornation to recommend specific changes in the program's operational procedures that might
maximize the program's positive socio-economic impact.
Methodology
In order to familiarize myself with the FUNDAID program, both in terms of its goals and
operational procedures and how it fit into broader efforts to alleviate poverty and promote small
business development, I spent July and August of 1996 in Trinidad conducting preliminary
research. Once familiar with these issues, I returned to Trinidad in January of 1997 to spend a
month conducting the actual program evaluation. The core research involved selecting a sample
of FUNDAID borrowers and interviewing them about their experience with the program and
their broader entrepreneurial experiences. It took approximately one week to select my sample
and review the background materials pertaining to these loans. I then spent 3 weeks
interviewing 41 borrowers. The information obtained through these interviews serves as the
basis for evaluating the impact of the FUNDAID program.
I used all loans granted in calendar years 1994 and 1995 as the universe from which to
select my sample. I deliberately excluded more recent loans because it takes some time for a
business investment to have an impact on enterprise profitability, and many of the microcredit
evaluation studies I examined in my preparatory research utilized a one-year window between
the cut-off date for the loans included in the sample and the date of the evaluation. 16 I did not
1 Some of the evaluation studies and methodology pieces I looked at included: Mead, Donald C. Dynamics of
Microenterprises: Research Issues and Approaches. GEMINI Project, 1991.; James, Vanus. Business Failure &
Success in Tobago. Department of Economics, University of the West Indies, n.d..; Fisher, William, Jeffrey Poyo,
and Ann Beasley. Evaluation of the Micro and Small Enterprise Development Project in Bolivia. GEMINI, 1992.;
Oldham et al.. Measuring Socioeconomic Impact of Credit on SM]: Assessment of the Monitoring System used bY
use loans made prior to January 1, 1994 because FUNDAID has made a number of changes in its
operating procedures in recent years and it has significantly scaled up the number of loans made
since those changes were made. So as to not overestimate the effects of those outdated policies
and procedures, FUNDAID's Managing Director strongly urged that I not include loans made
before this date. There were a total of 189 loans made between January 1, 1994 and December
31, 1995.
I had originally intended to interview a random sample of 45 borrowers (23.8% of the
loans made in the period studied) because this appeared to be a reasonable goal given the amount
of time I had to work with. Because I anticipated having some difficulty in locating and/or
gaining the consent of some of some of the selected borrowers to take part in the study, however,
I selected a random sample of 60 borrowers, the first 45 of which I intended to be the primary
sample. and the last 15 of which I intended to use as substitutes for those from the original
sample that I was unable to interview. After relentlessly pursuing all 45 of those in the original
sample., however. I was only able to interview 34 borrowers. One borrower had died. 2 refused
to speak with me, 3 were in Tobago making it logistically impossible to visit them given the
limited time frame I had to work with (and they had no telephones so I was unable to conduct a
phone interview), and the other 5 had moved and/or I was unable to locate them. After going
through the list of substitutes, I had only been able to interview 3 more people. In order to
address this problem and so as to increase my chances of successfully locating the highest
possible number of interviewees in the last few days of my research, I selected all the remaining
loans that were within an hour's drive of the capital city, with the exception of those in
the Alexandria Businessmen's Association, Egypt. GEMINI, 1994.; Sebstad, Jennifer. Get Ahead Foundation Credit
Programs in South Africa: The Effects of Loans on Client Enterprises. GEMINI, 1992.; and the 5 AIMS Project
desk studies on evaluating the impact of microcredit programs, USAID, 1996.
Laventille (one of the worst urban ghettos) because I had encountered much difficulty in locating
informants who resided in this area.17 All total, I interviewed 41 borrowers (21.7% of loans
issued in 1994 and 1995).
People who had moved (or else managed to successfully convince me that they were
unlocatable) comprise the majority of cases removed from the sample. As it is fairly unlikely
these borrowers could still be successfully operating their microenterprises given that their
families and neighbors either could or would not inform me of their present whereabouts, I
suspect that my sample would overstate (rather than understate) the positive impact of the
program. Because it is ultimately impossible to verify these outcomes and trace their
relationship to the FUNDAID loans, however, I am unable to say for sure how biased my sample
is and in what direction. Nevertheless, the 41 cases that I was able to examine provide some
very interesting and useful insights about the program and they are certainly worth examining.
After selecting the cases and reading the applications and any accompanying
correspondence. technical assistance notes, and/or arrears reports, I visited each informant and
spent anywhere from 30 to 90 minutes interviewing them. I conducted about half of the
interviews by myself and on the other half I was accompanied by one of two local residents who
guided me around the more remote areas of Trinidad (they would generally remain silent and
just observe during the interviews). I introduced myself as a student from the US doing some
research on FUNDAID, and I asked to speak with them to get their opinions about whether the
17 My difficulty in locating informants in Laventille was in large part due to the lack of accurate maps, street signs,
and residents who were willing to give correct directions. This is an extremely poor area and I was told by the one
Laventille resident I did interview that locals would give me incorrect directions because they tend to resent the
presence of outsiders in their neighborhood. (Middle-class Trinidadians rarely venture into this area for fear of their
safety.) I found this to be the case, as I was unable to locate 2 other Laventille borrowers due to the conflicting
directions I received from a number of passers-by. Eventually I gave up on finding any further informants in this
area.
program had helped them. All but 2 respondents agreed to speak with me. I did not tape any of
the interviews, but I did take notes. While I had prepared a 9 page questionnaire comprised of a
mixture of multiple choice and open-ended questions covering a whole range of topics, I found
that it worked better to allow the respondents to tell me their story and then guide them back to
the topics where I wanted more elaboration or very specific pieces of information. A copy of the
questionnaire is attached as Appendix B.
Because the outcomes in each case ranged from business failures where respondents had
household items repossessed to success stories where businesses had grown and "graduated" to
formal credit channels, the entire questionnaire was not relevant to each respondent and I
tailored the topics accordingly. The length and depth of the interviews were also a function of
the respondents' time availability and willingness to provide information. Three of the 41
interviews were conducted over phone. I was only able to see slightly more than half the
businesses in operation due to the fact that some business were no longer in operation or I had
caught the person at home rather that in his/her place of business. Finally, there were several
cases where the respondent actually managed the business in partnership with another person
who I was unable to interview, but I found that I was generally able to obtain enough
information to ascertain the overall impact of the credit in each individual case from the person I
interviewed.
Upon returning home with notes from the 41 interviews, I created an immense
spreadsheet that contained a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data on 105 variables for
each loan studied. A list of those variables is attached as Appendix C. This spreadsheet has
enabled me to analyze both quantitative and aspects of the program's impact and it serves as the
basis for the following analysis.
An Overview of the Loans Sampled
The 41 loans included in my final sample contained a range of business types. As seen
Table 2.1
Business Types By Sector
Services
38%
Agriculture
10%
Retail
37%
Manufacturing
15%
RIETAIL MFR AGR SVS
Parlor Furniture maker Veg farmer Shoe repair and fabrication
Snack shop
Minimart Fashion design/garment mfr Sheep farmer Hair salon
Minimart Garment construction Pig farmer Hair salon
Minimart Soft furnishings mfr/drapery design Pig farmer Hair salon
Dry goods shop Seamstress/mfr soft furnishings Barber salon
Dry goods shop Image consultant
Dry goods shop Leather craft manufacture
Dry goods shop & cafeteria Food outlet
Dry goods shop & cafeteria Food vendor
Shop/cafe Cafe & snackbar
Mobile hot dog cart
Amway Mobile peanut carts
Boutique Popcorn machine for parlor
Mobile haberdashery sales Restaurant
Puja shop (Hindu ceremonial supplies) Lawn care
Autobody/straightening shop
Pre-school
TOTAL =15 TOTAL= 6 TOTAL 4 TOTAL =16
in Table 2.1, the majority of the enterprises were service and retail establishments. When
classified by location, 49% of the businesses were urban, 41% rural, and 10% mobile.18 The
enterprises ranged in age from new start-ups to 15 year old businesses, with an average age of
3.7 years. More relevant than the actual ages of the enterprises, however, is their respective
stage of business development. Table 2.2 classifies the businesses sampled according to their
stage of business development. While 59% of the enterprises were primarily run by individuals,
17% by couples, 7% by parent and child teams, 15% by families, and 2% by unrelated partners, I
will refer to the one per-son who spent the most time running the business as the "primary
entrepreneur" throughout my paper.
Although mobile businesses can be primarily urban or rural, 1 decided to lump all mobile businesses together in a
single "mobile' category, and separate the remaining non-mobile businesses into rural and urban categories.
Table 2.2
Stage of Business Development
Recovering
.......... from Crisis
20%
29%
Need
Financing to
Maintain
Operations
5%
Expanding
Operations
46%
The primary entrepreneurs were 74% African, 22% Indian, 2% Syrian, and 2%
Caucasian. Since many people were of mixed race, and race is a particularly sensitive issue in
Trinidad, I simply classified people according to their complexion and any linguistic or religious
information they happened to offer rather then address this issue directly in the interviews.
Because of the unreliability of my racial classifications, I will avoid using race as a predictor
variable in my study. The primary entrepreneurs were 57% male and 43% female. The age
distribution of primary entrepreneurs is shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3
Distribution of Borrowers' Ages at Time of Application
9-
8-
7-
0 5-
4-
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 65
Age At Application
Almost half the primary entrepreneurs were married at the time of their initial loan application,
with 22% single, 15% in common law unions, 12% separated, and 2% widowed. A full 69% of
the primary entrepreneurs were heads of households. The number of dependents per household
ranged from 0 to 7 with an average of 2.5 dependents per household.
I was only able to obtain education information for 15 of the primary entrepreneurs. The
age at which these respondents had last attended school ranged from 13 to 18 with an average of
16.7 years old. Since I lack education data for such a large proportion of the sample, and since
there was so little variation in the data I did find, I will not refer to this variable very often in my
paper. The respondents had learned their trades from a variety of sources. The largest share,
32%, had no training at all, while 27% had learned from their family, 24% through a training
course, 10% through a related job, and 7% through a related apprenticeship. Only 5 primary
entrepreneurs (12%) had owned a separate business before.
As mentioned earlier, the loans included in my sample were issued in the calendar years
1994 and 1995. Table 2.4 shows the chronological distribution of loans. The majority of
respondents (83%) had received only one loan, while 15% had received 2 loans, and 2% had
received 4 loans. I only examined the loans issued in the time frame studied, however. The loan
sizes ranged from $1,146 to $15,000, with an average of $8,437.
Table 2.4
Chronological Distribution of Loans
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Table 2.5 shows the distribution of loan size. The loan terms ranged from 3 to 30
months with an average of 20 months. The vast majority of loans had a 24 month term, with the
next most frequent terms being 12 months, 30 months, 18 months, and 6 months. Installment
sizes ranged from $289 to $1,532/month with an average of $531/month, but the majority fell
between $350 - $550/month.
Table 2.6
Percentage by Which Borrowers Had to Increase Base Loan
to Cover FUNDAID Fees
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Table 2.6 shows the distribution of the percentages by which borrowers had to increase their
base loans to cover FUNDAID fees. It turns out, however, that larger loans tended to have the
largest proportional fees. Finally, Table 2.7 shows the distribution of business facilities by
tenure.
Table 2.7
Business Facilities & Tenure
w% E -
E E '
C ) U 0 0
In dwelling, shared space 5%/ - - - 5%
Attached to dwelling 120% 5% - 2% - - 27%
Seperate structure in yard 7% 7% 5% - - - 19%
Outdoor business in yard 2% 2% - - - - 4%
Seperate location 2% 2% 17% 5% 2% - 28%
Mobile Business 7% - - - - 7% 14%
43% 16% 22% 7% 2% 7% 97%
Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.
Chapter III.
Does FUNDAID Fill A Credit Gap?
Small businesses can be capitalized through a number of different sources including
income from entrepreneurs' savings, other jobs, family, commercial lending institutions, and/or
informal credit sources such moneylenders or revolving savings and credit groups (called sou-
sou's in Trinidad). Indeed, as seen in Table 3.1, many of the entrepreneurs sampled did use a
variety of these sources, and most used multiple sources simultaneously.' The table illustrates a
relatively high reliance on self-financing through savings, family, spousal income or income
from other jobs. It also shows some reliance on supplier credit, sou-sou's, and "other" sources
which range from severance pay and divorce settlements to liquidation of assets and advances
from customers. The fact that entrepreneurs must rely on such a wide variety of funding sources,
2 ggests that any single source of financing would not have been
often simultaneously, sugetthtaysnlsoreofiacgwudnthvebn
sufficient to meet the financing needs of these enterprises. When you consider that FUNDAID
targets poor entrepreneurs, it makes sense that self-financing would have its limitations since
many of these entrepreneurs would presumably have only a limited amount of savings, other
income, spousal income or family assets. Family assets, in particular are subject to limitation, as
many respondents who reported using family assistance to capitalize their enterprises indicated
that this was an unreliable or "last resort" source of funds.
1 Table 3.1 does not include private moneylenders because no respondents reported using this source of financing.
My interview with a business loan officer from one of the nation's largest commercial banks did reveal that he has
made loans to 1 moneylender who openly stated he was taking the bank loans to re-lend the money at higher interest
rates to people who could not qualify for commercial financing. I am unable to say how common this is, however.
2 In fact, only 7 out of 41 respondents (17%7) reported using only one source of financing in addition to the
FUNDAID loan.
Table 3.1
Sources of Business Financing Respondents Reported Having Ever Used
(by Sector and Type of Business)
Pig farm X
Agriculture Pig farm X X X X
(n=4) Sheep farm X X X
Vegetable farmer X X
Fashion design and garment manufacture X X
Furniture maker X
Manufacturing Garment construction X
(n=6) Leather craft manufacture X
Seamstress & mfr. soft furnishings X
Soft furnishings mfr. and drapery design X
Amway distributorship X X
Boutique X X
Dry goods shop X X X
Dry goods shop X X
Dry goods shop & cafe X X X X
Retail Dry goods shop & cafeteria X X X
(n= 14) Dry goods shop & cafeteria X X X
Minimart X X X
Minimart X X X
Minimart X X X X
Mobile haberdashery sales X X
Parlor X
Pula shop (Hindu ceremonial supplies) X X
Snack sho X X
Autobody & straightening shop X X
Barber salon X X X
Cafe & snackbar X
Restaurant X X X
Food outlet X X
Food vendor X
Hair salon X X
Hair salon X X X X
Services Hair salon X X X X
(n=16) Image consultant X X X
Lawn care X X
Mobile peanut carts X X
Mobile hot dog cart X X X
Popcorn machine for parlor X
Pre-school X X
Shoe repair and fabrication -- X X X
63% 35% 25% 23% 23% 20% 20% 20%
Aside from self-financing mechanisms, the most commonly used source of credit was
supplier credit, which 23% of respondents (9 entrepreneurs) reported using. Of these, however, 4
enterprises were service businesses which tend to use relatively few inputs over a very long
periods of time, suggesting that purchasing inputs would not be a very big cost center for this
type of business. While retail businesses tend to expend a lot of money purchasing stock for
resale, only 29% of the retail businesses reported having access to supplier credit (only slightly
higher than the 25% of service businesses which reportedly utilized supplier credit). No
manufacturing businesses reported using supplier credit, and only one agricultural business
reported being able to purchase inputs (seeds, chemicals, and equipment) on credit. It is
interesting to note that many businesses were not even able to purchase equipment on credit
through major department stores (called hire-purchase in Trinidad) because they lacked a steady
source of income to qualify for store credit. Only one entrepreneur actually reported using this
source of financing, but he then needed a FUNDAID loan to purchase additional equipment, as
he was still paying off the hire-purchase agreement for the initial store purchase and he could not
qualify for additional store credit until he had completed payments on the first item.
While revolving savings and credit groups or sou-sou's were used by a fifth of the
respondents, it should be noted that these informal loan pools serve as savings mechanisms as
often as credit mechanisms. Because each person in the group makes a fixed pay-in at regular
intervals and the sum is then paid out to each participant in turn until every contributor has
received the full "hand" once, this mechanism only serves as a credit mechanism if one is lucky
enough to receive the pay-out early in the process. Since the pay-out schedules for sou-sou's in
Trinidad are often determined by random chance through the drawing of lots, entrepreneurs can't
count on this mechanism as a reliable source of financing for their enterprises. 3
Perhaps the most interesting finding revealed in Table 3.1 is that only 20% of
respondents (8 entrepreneurs) reported ever having used commercial credit channels to finance
their entrepreneurial activities. Of those, 2 were agricultural businesses that obtained financing
through a special government program administered through the Agricultural Development
Bank.4 One was a medium enterprise that used a FUNDAID loan to supplement a TT $80,000
commercial bank loan. One was a very old commercial business loan for a previous businesses
that had long since gone into default (thus spoiling the entrepreneur's credit record and causing
the bank to foreclose on his house). 5 The remaining 4 were personal loans, 3 of which were
issued for home improvements which were generally used to house business activities, and one
of which was issued to cover medical expenses in conjunction with the entrepreneur's husband's
acute diabetes, the excess of which was diverted to cover business expenses. This would suggest
that the vast majority of these businesses, with the exception of agricultural businesses, were
unable to obtain business financing through commercial channels, even when obtained as
personal as opposed to business loans.
When asked why they were unable to obtain financing through commercial channels (see
Table 3.2) respondents most frequently reported that they lacked the necessary liquid collateral
3 Sou-sou's are quite common in Trinidad and they can range in size from a few people to hundreds, running
anywhere from a few weeks to more than a year. While most sou-sou's don't involve any interest or fees,
participants are usually expected to tip the organizer when they receive their "hand" or pay-out. There are some
cases, however, when participants are required to pay a "box" or fee to the organizer. This fee is generally deducted
from each month's pay-out. If a participant receives his/her "hand" early in the process and then fails to repay (i.e.
contribute to future pots), the organizer is generally expected to make up this amount. This is often used as ajustification for organizers who wish to charge a "box" fee.
4 Since the Agricultural Development Bank is a government institution, it is arguable whether this can be classified
as a source of "commercial" credit.
5 I am unsure why FUNDAID's credit check didn't detect this borrower's poor credit history.
to secure a commercial loan (46%). While the 63% of respondents who reportedly used savings
to finance their entrepreneurial activities could potentially have utilized these funds as liquid
collateral to leverage commercial financing, it is impossible to say whether they would have been
able to accumulate enough cash to secure a loan large enough to finance the particular project
they had in mind. In fact, many of these entrepreneurs reported having problems with cash flow
which suggests that they would have had problems accumulating large sums of cash, particularly
during the periods in which they most needed to borrow. My interview with a business loan
officer for one of the nation's largest commercial banks confirmed that first-time borrowers
comprise only a small minority of his loan portfolio and, while loan officer discretion does play a
key role in determining who gets loans, all first-time borrowers are required to post liquid
collateral funds equaling the amount they wish to borrow. As this requirement was largely a
function of the "due diligence" required to protect depositors against excessively large levels of
risk as part of the national banking regulations, he was certain that other banks enforced the same
requirement. Indeed, it would seem that lack of liquid collateral does present formidable barrier
to gaining access to business financing for many microentrepreneurs.
While FUNDAID procedures do require loan officers to ask loan applicants whether they
have tried to obtain commercial financing before approaching FUNDAID, applicants are not
required to provide any proof (i.e. rejection letters from banks), these figures are not recorded,
and applicants who have not first sought commercial loans are not turned away from FUNDAID.
In fact, FUNDAID reasons that banks' unwillingness to give very small loans is so pronounced
that "the system" automatically steers microentrepreneurs to FUNDAID, SME's to SBDC, and
all other business borrowers to commercial lending institutions. The fact that roughly a quarter
Table 3.2
Reasons Why Respondents Did Not Obtain Financing From a Commercial Bank
(by Sector and Type of Business)
Pig farm X X
Agriculture Sheep farm X X
(n=3) Vegetable farmer I X X
Fashion design and garment manufacture X
Manufacturing Furniture maker X X
(n=5) Leather craft manufacture X
Seamstress & mfr. soft furnishings X
Soft furnishings mfr. and drapery design X X X
Amwa distributorshi- - - X X
Boutique X
D rgoods shop X X
D rgoods shop X
Dry goods shop X X
Retail Dry goods shop & cafe X X
(n=14) Dr oods sho~ & cafeteria X X
D r goods shop & cafeteria X,:
Minimart X I
Minimart X x
Minimart X
Mobile haberdashery sales X
Parlor X X X
Snack shop X
Autobody & straightening shop X
Barber salon X
Cafe & snackbar X X
Restaurant x
Food outlet X X X
Services Food vendor X
(n=15) Hair salon X X
Hair salon X
Hair salon X x
Image consultant X
Lawn care x X X
Mobile hot dog cart X
Popcorn machine for parlor X X
Pre-school X X
Shoe repair and fabrication IIX
46%I19%I14%I11%I8% 27%E19%I t9%
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In 2 OUT of t cases the outmiandinQ loan was for an old business Thal1 failed prior to start of current business
of the respondents did report being referred by commercial banks, the SBDC and/or YTEPP to
FUNDAID does suggest that an integrated system based on loan size does exist.6 The
commercial loan officer that I spoke to, however, placed less emphasis on loan size and more on
credit history and collateral as the key distinguishing criteria.
In addition to banks' unwillingness to make very small loans, particularly to people who
lack 100% liquid collateral, there are some other, more informal factors that may contribute to
respondents' inability to gain access to commercial financing. First, commercial banks require
applicants to provide written business plans and formal financial statements which many of the
entrepreneurs I interviewed would not have been able to produce. In fact, less than half of the
entrepreneurs interviewed reported keeping any financial records at all, and those that did often
kept very rudimentary or incomplete records. In the course of attending a FUNDAID training
session, I also observed that some FUNDAID borrowers are only marginally literate. In fact, one
can be entirely illiterate and still receive a FUNDAID loan since the loan officers fill out 100% of
the required paperwork. In contrast, it would be extremely difficult for someone with limited
literacy skills to obtain a loan through a commercial bank. Because the banking sector has been a
key employment sector in Trinidad, banks are also viewed a something of a cultural icon which
draws the line between the "have's" and the "have-not's." Banks are generally extremely formal
and it is not uncommon for laborers to go home and change into more formal attire before
entering a bank. The commercial loan officer I interviewed indicated (albeit somewhat
6 FUNDAID has a strong cooperative relationship with the SBDC and a number of major commercial banks. In fact,
since FUNDAID doesn't have an office in Tobago, the SBDC Tobago office serves as a pseudo-FUNDAID office,
educating entrepreneurs about the program, screening applicants, and recommending loans. FUNDAID also posts a
loan officer one day per week in each of the various branches of Republic Bank, one of the major national
commercial banks. This collaboration undoubtedly facilitates communication and coordination amongst FUNDAID
and Republic Bank, further facilitating the division of labor and the referral process.
reluctantly) that if a rural farmer, for instance, does not dress appropriately during an interview,
his chances of receiving a loan are limited. This may explain why only 5 of the entrepreneurs I
interviewed (14%) reported actually having had a loan application turned down by a commercial
bank before approaching FUNDAID -- perhaps poor people are hesitant to even approach
commercial banks if they are sure to face class- (and possibly even race-) based discrimination.
Taken together, the evidence does suggest that FUNDAID fills a demonstrated credit gap.
Whether all the borrowers sampled would have fallen into this gap if FUNDAID did not exist,
however, is another question. As seen in Table 3.2, 24 % of the FUNDAID clients I interviewed
(9 respondents) reported that they chose not to obtain financing through commercial channels
solely because there was too much "red tape" at banks, they preferred to deal with a small
business oriented program, and/or they could obtain better terms at FUNDAID. I can not be
certain that these 9 respondents could have obtained credit through commercial channels had
they tried (in fact I would venture to guess that at least some of them probably would not have
been able to get commercial credit due to lack of liquid collateral - a problem that they for some
reason did not report), but there are a few cases where they almost certainly could have. One
borrower. for instance had a very large commercial bank loan and she used FUNDAID for a
bridge loan to make it possible to get a new venture off the ground, as she had already reached
her commercial credit limit and she still needed to finance the purchase of start-up stock.7 Three
other respondents also had outstanding business loans, but one was for an old failed venture, and
7 While there is some question as to whether this borrower should have been granted a FUNDAID loan as she is
certainly not poor, it should be noted that she got her first FUNDAID loan may years ago for a much smaller home-
based start-up that eventually did very well, helping to improve her overall financial situation. Nevertheless, she has
unquestionably been in Trinidad's upper social strata all her life as she was born into a wealthy family, married well,
and has continued to live well even after the dissolution of her marriage thanks to a very comfortable alimony
arrangement.
two were agricultural loans. In a two other cases, respondents did post liquid collateral, but in
both cases the deposits were in someone else's name and in only one case was the deposit was
large enough to cover the loan (i.e. meeting the securitization requirement at commercial banks).
In a few other cases, respondents had either formally posted or anticipated receiving large cash
payments such as accrued COLA's on pensions, interest on life insurance policies, or an
inheritance. Whether these holdings would have satisfied a commercial bank's liquid collateral
requirement, however, is uncertain.
While consumer credit has less stringent security requirements and is general easier to
obtain than business credit in Trinidad, Table 3.2 reveals that only 19% of respondents (7
entrepreneurs) had outstanding personal loans at the time of the interviews. Of these, more than
half were home loans (1 mortgage and 3 construction loans).8 The other 3 consisted of a loan for
medical expenses, a car loan that had long since gone into default, and a credit union loan for
personal expenses. The commercial lending officer I interviewed reported that the key criterion
for personal consumer loans was a steady source of income, a requirement that is difficult to
meet via microenterprise income alone (particularly since most of the entrepreneurs I interviewed
didn't keep any written records). While 35% of respondents held paid jobs in addition to running
their businesses, only 13% had full time jobs which would almost certainly be necessary to meet
the income requirements to obtain a consumer loan. The fact that 19% reported outstanding
personal loans is in part a function of the fact that some commercial banks will base consumer
credit eligibility on total household income as opposed an individual's income, and in part a
Trinidad has very low home ownership rates so it is rare to see people mortgaging homes as security for business
loans. Ayse Pamuk, in a study done for the Ministry of Housing, found that low housing affordability, limited
financing availability, and a restrictive regulatory system caused more than 75% of the new homes built between
1980 and 1990 to be built outside of the legal framework. Therefore, even those people who do own relatively new
homes often do not hold formal legal title, without which it is impossible to mortgage a home.
reflection of the fact that some of the bigger, more formal enterprises are able document a steady
entrepreneurial income that meets the bank's consumer lending requirements.
The fact that FUNDAID offers a fixed interest rate of 13.5%, a few points lower than
commercial interest rates may help explain why some borrowers who didn't necessarily need to
go to FUNDAID preferred to do so. Indeed, if it cost them less to borrow from FUNDAID than
commercial banks, of course sensible customers would go to FUNDAID. 9 Because FUNDAID,
like a commercial bank, also needs to lend money out in order to earn money off the interest, it
seems that it would be in both parties' interest to make these loans. From the donor's
perspective, however, it is questionable whether or not it makes sense to subsidize FUNDAID's
activity in this area. If donors are simply contributing to FUNDAID's ability to duplicate service
already offered by commercial banks, and more importantly to undercut the rates offered by
banks, they are not only drawing funds away from those who truly can not gain access to
commercial financing, but they are using public funds to distort the commercial credit market.
Although FUNDAID doesn't turn away clients who actually could get credit through commercial
channels, the fact that they limit their loan size to a maximum of TT $30,000 does limit the
potential for distortionary effects. As businesses requiring loans of this size are generally
considered marginal anyway, perhaps it is not so bad that FUNDAID extends its services to this
group (which again comprises just over a quarter of the borrowers I interviewed). This argument
9 Although FUNDAID's interest rate is several points lower than commercial bank rates, I have not been able to
determine whether the total cost of borrowing (i.e interest +fees) would be lower at FUNDAID because I was not
able to get comparison data on the fee structure for loans of this type at commercial banks. As seen in Table 2.6,
however, FUNDAID charges extremely high fees (particularly the mandatory $1,000/year accounting fee) which
force borrowers to increase their base loan by as much as 50%. In light of the exorbitant fee structure, it is likely that
the total cost of borrowing at FUNDAID actually exceeds that of commercial banks. If this were true, the fact that
borrowers would willingly go to FUNDAID knowing that it costs them more than commercial banks would only add
to the evidence suggesting that FUNDAID does indeed fill a credit gap. I suspect, however, that most clients did not
have access to full information about their various options before making their decision as to which financing source
to use.
would be further strengthened if literacy, class, and race-based discrimination is taken into
account. Still, if Trinidad wants to promote a fine-tuned market-oriented credit system, it might
want to suggest that FUNDAID require its applicants to prove that they are unable to obtain
commercial financing by submitting formal denial letters from commercial banks as a mandatory
FUNDAID eligibility requirement.
Chapter IV.
Assessing the Impact of FUNDAID Loans on the Assisted Enterprises
Now that I have established that FUNDAID does in fact fill a demonstrated credit gap, at
least for some borrowers, I will explore the reasons why the entrepreneurs interviewed needed to
borrow money to begin with, what types of projects they financed with the loan proceeds, and
whether these investments effectively increased their income once the costs of borrowing were
factored in. Because the net income effect of a given investment will tend to change over time
depending on the type of investment,' the time at which once chooses to measure the net income
effect is key. The best possible solution to this problem is to measure the net income (income -
expenses) of the assisted enterprise at several points in time -- mainly before the loan, during the
repayment period, and after the loan is paid off. Even if there is a net decrease in income during
the repayment period, as long as the net income after the loan is paid off exceeds the net income
before the loan was taken, the loan can be said to have had a positive net impact on the
enterprise. As I was unable to make repeated site visits over time, I was forced to rely on the
2respondent recall, which is a much less accurate method of data collection. As most of the
entrepreneurs I interviewed, however, did not keep records and did not even have a general sense
of their present net income levels (never mind their past income levels), it proved impossible to
Liquid investments such as stock for a minimart or inputs for a manufacturer will generally tend to pay for
themselves relatively quickly as they are only associated with few units of goods which can sold quickly and he costs
of the inputs recouped. Fixed investments such as machinery or the construction of a new facility, however, will take
a very long time to pay for themselves because their costs must be averaged over the sales of a very large number of
units.
2 Inserra, Anne. A Review of the Approachesfor Measurement of Microenterprise and Household Income. AIMS
Project (USAID), 1996, pp. 8.
garner the information necessary to use this evaluation method. Therefore, I was forced to come
up with some other proxy for change in income.
The lack of financial data was only one of the problems I faced in trying to gauge the
effects of the loans on the income-levels of the assisted enterprises. In fact the "enterprises"
proved to be quite elusive entities as most entrepreneurs (82%) co-mingled business and personal
funds, cross-subsidizing when necessary. This was further complicated by the fact that many of
the entrepreneurs actually had several source of personal income (other jobs and businesses - to
be discussed at length in the next chapter), which would then be mixed, not only with the
business funds, but also with the funds of any other income-earners in the household. In fact the
assisted enterprise turned out to be the sole source of household income in only 4 cases (10% of
enterprises surveyed).
Even if I did have some means of addressing the fungibility problem, I would still have
difficulty attributing any perceived changes in enterprise income-levels to the loans. Because the
fate of a business can be affected by so many different forces -- competition, price wars, changes
in consumer preferences, cost and availability of inputs, locational considerations, management
variables, etc... -- it is very difficult to isolate the effects of a single factor such as a particular
investment financed by a loan. These factors, in combination with my inability to construct a
comparison group that did not have access to a credit program, make it nearly impossible for me
to attribute specific outcomes to the investments financed by the loans.
In light of the formidable methodological obstacles to evaluating the income-effects of
the loans, I am forced to come up with a seat-of-the pants method for roughly assessing the
income-effects of the loans. Short of any other option, I will simply examine the types of
investments financed with the loans and roughly assess the likelihood that they would be
essential to the enterprises' continued operations and/or be likely to increase the enterprise's
income. I then will consider the repayment experiences of the respective borrowers, identifying
and probing the cases where borrowers had difficulty repaying the loans, and separating those
who repaid the loans with business earnings from those who repaid the loans with funds from
other sources. Finally, I will roughly estimate each enterprise's overall profitability level,
defining the break-even point as the point at which gross income equals gross expenditure, where
loan installments and employee salaries are included in gross expenditure but the primary
entrepreneur's salary is not. For enterprises that are still making loan payments, I will estimate
both present profitability and projected future profitability after the loan is paid off; for paid off
loans, I will only estimate present profitability. By considering all three of these factors in
tandem, I hope to be able to distinguish between the cases where the loan had a net positive
income-effect on the enterprise and those where it had an unclear or negative effect. While this
is a far cry from systematically monitoring precise changes in enterprise earnings levels and
attributing any perceived changes to an isolated investment financed by a FUNDAID loan,
unfortunately it is the best that I can do under the circumstances.
The first step in understanding the impact of a credit program is determining why the
borrowers needed credit to begin with. As Table 3.1 in the preceding chapter illustrates, these
firms already utilize multiple different sources of funds and one wonders whether these
businesses could not have simply financed these investments through their normal sources of
funds without taking a loan. It turns out, however, that many of the entrepreneurs interviewed
were particularly "cash short" just prior to taking the loan for a number of specific reasons.
Table 4.1 illustrates that 40% of the entrepreneurs surveyed reported having just made
significant business investments which compromised their cash flow. While the vast majority of
these investments were associated with the acquisition or construction of new facilities,
entrepreneurs also reported having invested in leasehold improvements, land, equipment, and
vehicles. It is interesting to note that expanding businesses reported having self-financed
significant business investments just prior to taking a FUNDAID loan nearly as often as new
ventures, indicating that investments, and by extension, credit, may be equally necessary at
severally different stages of the firm life-cycle, not just at start-up. Aside from business
investments, respondents reported having just made significant personal expenditures (4%),
having been affected by crises such as burglary, illness or a bad crop (14%), and other factors
such as persistent poverty (12%), lack of independent income to finance income-generating
activities (10%), and basic cash flow shortages that prevented them from financing the particular
Table 4.2
Use of Borrowed Funds
(by Stage of Business Development and Type of Business)
STAGE TYPE OF BUSINESS USE OF FUNDS
Amway distributorship marketing materials, stock
Barber salon build benches and installTV in waiting room
Cafe & snackbar microwave, stock
Dry goods shop freezer
Food outlet stove, microwave
Furniture maker planing machine
Garment construction sewing machine, materials
Hair salon construction materials
Hair salon construction materials, supplies
Expanding Image consultant fax machine, A/C, presentation folders, mirrors
(n=1 9) Leather craft manufacture heavy duty sewing machine, stock
Minimart construction materials & labor
IMobile haberdashery sales stock
Parlor paint, stock
Popcorn machine for parlor industrial popcorn machine
Pre-school material for plumbing & electrical work in new school
Seamstress & mfr. soft furnishings replace old sewing machine
Shoe repair and fabrication band saw, materials
__________Snack shop build counter/expand space, stock
Maintaining Fashion design and garment industrial sewing machine
(n=2) Food vendor replace old cooler, stock
Autobody & straightening shop welder, grinder, compressor
Dry goods shop & cafeteria stock
IHair salon install styling stations in salon
Minimart shelving, paint, fixtures
Mobile hot dog cart blender, cooler, stock
New Venture Mobile peanut carts refurbish carts, stock
(n=12) 1Pig farm 75 piglets
Pig farm 1pens, feed
Puja shop (Hindu ceremonial supplies) construction materials, stock
Restaurant stock
Sheep farm 23 baby sheep ( 8 were pregnant)
___________Soft furnishings mfr. and drapery design cupboards for showroom, industrial sewing machine
Boutique showcase, locks, stock
Dry goods shopstc
Dry goods shopstc
Recovering kDry goods shop & cafe stock
(n=8) Dry goods shop &cftrastock
Lawn care trimmer, chainsaw, blower
IMinimart stock ____________________
___________Vegetable farmer chemicals, plants
investment project at hand (17%). In light of these prior expenses, it appears reasonable that
these entrepreneurs would have had to access an additional source of funds in order to finance
any additional investment activity at the time.
The next question is what types of investment activities did these entrepreneurs so
desperately need to undertake that it was worth the cost and risk of borrowing to do so. As
shown in Table 4.2, the loan funds were used for a wide variety of purposes, but they generally
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(by Stage of Business Development)
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Since borrowers could use funds for multiple purposes, individual loans may be allocated to more than one catagory. As a result,
the percetages show are taken as a share of the total number of investments made (n=55).
covered only part of the investments necessary to run any given business. That is, a pig farmer,
for example, could borrow to purchase piglets or pens and feed but not both.
Table 4.3 groups the investments by the general purpose and stage of business
development. It shows that nearly half the loans were grants for working capital, with the
majority going to expanding operations and successively less to new and recovering ventures. It
should be noted that working capital was almost never devoted to salary (in fact most
entrepreneurs rarely took salary - an issue I shall cover in depth in the next chapter) but to stock
for retail ventures and inputs for service, manufacturing, and agricultural businesses. It is
interesting that stock loans comprised the lion's share of loans to recovering ventures, which
tended to be minimarts and dry goods shops (see Table 4.2). More than half the equipment loans
went to expanding operations, followed by new ventures, ventures trying to maintain operations,
and recovering ventures. While investments in leasehold improvements were split evenly among
new ventures and expanding operations, expanding operations borrowed to construct facilities at
more than twice the rate of new ventures. Given that more new ventures had new facilities than
expanding operations, however, this is probably a function of the fact that new ventures tended to
self-finance the construction of facilities, preferring to borrow for working capital, equipment or
leasehold improvements, while expanding operations preferred to borrow for facilities and self-
finance other types of investments.
The question of whether a given investment is essential to an enterprise and whether it is
likely to increase the enterprise's earnings will largely depend on where the firm is in its business
life-cycle. The 2 firms that were trying to maintain their current levels of operation primarily
needed to borrow to replace aging equipment. While this is not likely to increase their business
earnings (in fact, it will result in a net decrease in enterprise earnings in the short run as they now
have to make loan installments), the investments are undoubtedly essential to the survival of their
operations. Similarly, the recovering ventures may not see large increases in earnings, but as
they have generally had to deplete their business resources to cope with temporary crises, they
undoubtedly needed to invest in stock to reestablish their enterprises in order to stay in business.
It is very hard to tell whether the new ventures will realize increased earnings (i.e. turn a profit)
as a result of the investments made with the loans because many new ventures take a while to get
off the ground, often running at a loss for some time before they eventually break-even and begin
to turn a profit. One new venture in my sample, a sheep farm, had been running at a steady loss
for over a year because the animals had not yet matured enough to be ready for slaughter
(although the flock had increased from 23 to more than 70). By and large, however, the new
ventures tended to channel the loan funds into investments that were essential to their operations,
without which it would have been difficult or impossible to operate. Therefore, the question of
whether the investments were essential and whether they really increased enterprise earnings is
most relevant to the ventures who took on debt to finance an investment that was designed to
expand their operations.
In the expanding operations, it is difficult to argue that any of the investments undertaken
were essential to the continued operation of the enterprises. Rather, most of these investments
were made in an effort to diversify or improve the quality of goods and services delivered or to
improve the efficiency of operations (see Table 4.4). The investments designed to increase
enterprise income by diversifying product lines tend to fall into 2 categories: equipment to assist
food reparation or manufacturing businesses to diversify the products they produce, and stock
loans that are simply used to buy a different type of product. The other rationale for investments
in stock is building stock in anticipation of future sales. One women who ran an endurant if not
successful minimart told me "if you have stock, it will sell." Whether this actually turns out to
be the case, however, will make or break these tiny ventures. Indeed, knowing one's market is an
essential part of strategically investing to successfully expand a microenterprise. That's why
both those investments designed to attract more customers (such as signs and presentation
materials) and those designed to enhance the ambiance in existing business facilities may or may
not be worth the money, depending on the type of business, the nature of the market and the
specific investment made. While the image consultant's investment in a fax machine and
Table 4.4
Rationale for Borrowing to Expand Operating Businesses
(by Sector and Type of Business)
SECTOR TYPE OF BUSINESS USE OF FUNDS
Fashion design & garment nrir. industrial sewing machine, stock X X
Manufacture Furiture maker aning rmachine X(n=4) Garnnnt construction sewing machine, mterials X X
Leather craft nuifacttre heavy duty sewin nachine, stock X X
Amway distributorship narketing materials, stock X X
Dry goods shop freezer X
Mininrtut construction materials & labor X
Retail Mobile haberdashery sales stock X(n=7) Parlor paint, stock X X X
Popcorn machine for parlor industrial popcorn nachine X
Snack shop build counter/agwnd space, stock X X
Barber salon build benches and install TV in waiting room X
Cate & sarckbar irowave, stock X X
Food outlet stove, nicrowove X X
Service Hair salon construction naterials X X(n=8) Hair salon construction nuterials, stpplies X X
Inage conultant fax machine, NC, presentation folders, nirrors X X
Pre-school material for plunbing & electrical work in new bldg X
__ _ Shoe repair and fabrication band saw. materials X X X
37% 32% 21% 21*/ 21% 16/. 16% 5% 5%
presentation folders appears to have paid off as it has helped her land a few big corporate
accounts, the barber's investment in benches and a TV for his waiting room are arguably money
that might have been better spent otherwise (as no one was even in his waiting room when I
visited during lunch hour on a weekday in busy downtown Port-of-Spain). Those investments
designed to improve efficiency and vertically integrate the production process, as well as to pay
for the inputs involved in preparing orders already obtained, seem to make the most sense. In
cases where the entrepreneur already has a process which he can improve upon either in terms of
cost or time-efficiency, there is relatively little risk involved as long as the demand for the
product is there. That's why pre-payments on advance orders are perhaps the safest expansion-
oriented investments, although I did see some cases where this method failed because the
customers rescinded the orders at the last moment. All in all, however, it appears that the
entrepreneurs sampled had fairly good reasons to borrow and relatively rational plans to utilize
the money. The next question, then, is could they pay it back?
The portfolio of loans included in the sample had an overall delinquency rate (that is loan
that are greater than 3 months in arrears) of 15%3. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of payment
status for the full portfolio of loans surveyed. It is interesting to note that more than half the loan
were either paid off, up to date or less than one month in arrears as of Nov. 30, 1996. Also, the
share of paid off loans is approximately 50% larger than the share of delinquent loans. The high
share of paid off loans should not be misinterpreted, however, as most FUNDAID loans have a 6
month to 1 year term, and I purposely selected my sample from loans made 1-3 years prior to my
3 Note that this figure is far greater than the 6.77% delinquency rate reported in FUNDAID's self-assessment
instrument, the Summary Loan Statistics issued October 31, 1996, just 3 months prior to my evaluation. I am
uncertain whether this may indicate some bias in my sample (although that's unlikely since I was more likely to
exclude defunct as opposed to prospering businesses, thus overestimating the positive impact of the program) or in
FUNDAID's method of calculating and reporting this statistic.
January, 1997 evaluation so as to allow the investments financed by the loans some time to have
an impact on the businesses.
The repayment rate is significant, not only because it affects FUNDAID's long-term
financial sustainability, but also because inability to repay a loan has serious implications for
borrowers. As seen in Table 4.6, 17% (n=7) borrowers have had to have their loans rescheduled
and an equal share has had household items repossessed. In 6 of the 7 cases of rescheduling of
loans, the borrowers were unable to keep up with their original payment schedule and so
FUNDAID was forced to reschedule to loans to give them an opportunity to reconcile the
situation by making smaller payments spread over a longer period of time. The seventh case
involved a borrower who was actually ahead in his repayment schedule but wanted to refinance
so he could borrow more money to finance another investment before he had fully completed
Table 4.6
Repayment Data
(by loan status)
Loan Status
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10.62 149 $13,217 86% Y
4.94 85 $3,591 41% Y
>3 Months in Arrears 4.31 54 $1,017 86% Y Y
(n=6) 4.03 95 $13,469 76%
3.64 16 $4,657 66% Y
3.28 103 $3,844 35%
2.92 10 $1,666 41% Y
2.51 45 $14,093 61%
2.18 24 $9,280 58%
2.11 30 $2,654 56% Y
2.01 24 $7,021 37% Y
1-3 Months in Arrears 1.70 37 $5,032 50%
(n=12) 1.60 37 $1,408 28%
1.45 18 $3,696 29%
1.41 12 $2,280 88% Y
1.38 32 $3,119 32%
1.37 1 $3,629 29%
1.02 17 $8,519 54%
0.94 32 $7,956 43%
0.72 18 $5,095 73% Y Y
0.63 323 $587 11% Y Y
0.47 24 $7,261 45%
<1 Month in Arrears 0.36 8 $3,968 46%
(n=10) 0.35 61 $189 6%
0.32 8 $2,654 56%
0.27 22 $3,721 47%
0.16 3 $9,179 49%
0.03 8 $11,165 56% Y
-0.23 24 $17,025 100%
Up to Date -0.70 12 $8,249 48%
(n=4) -2.51 32 $3,046 28%
-9.98 88 $263 3%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
Paid Off 0.00 N/A $0 0%
(n=9) 0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
0.00 N/A $0 0%
17% 17%
repaying the first loan. It is interesting to note that all but one of the borrowers who had their
loans rescheduled have had continued problems meeting their repayment schedules, and half
have ultimately had household items repossessed.
A closer look at the enterprises themselves reveals that repayment rate is, in fact, not as
accurate a portrayal of an enterprises' performance as one might think. This is illustrated by the
fact that my sample only showed a 15% delinquency rate, yet a full 29% of loans (12 enterprises)
were no longer in operation at the time of my interviews! It is those cases where enterprises have
failed, and borrowers have been forced to find some other means of generating
income to repay the loans that are perhaps the most striking finding of this study. As shown in
Table 4.7, one quarter of the business failures 4 were directly due to the loans. These were all
retail operations where the profit margins on the investments were not large enough to cover the
loan installments, so the borrowers were forced to drain all the working capital out of their
enterprises to service their loans, ultimately causing the closure of the businesses. Nearly half of
the closures were not directly related to the loans but to other business-related factors such as
management and marketing problems. The final quarter of business closures were due to non-
business related factors such as illness or family crises. Nevertheless, since the entrepreneurs in
all of these cases had borrowed to invest in enterprises that no longer had the capacity to generate
income, and as a result, they were forced to come up with some other source of income to repay
the loans, the loans undoubtedly had a net negative impact on the entrepreneurs (if not the
enterprises) in all of these cases in the long-run.
4 While some of the borrowers' whose businesses were no longer in operation at the time of my interviews expressed
a desire to re-establish the enterprises at some point t in the future, their ability to do so varied greatly according to
numerous factors too difficult to measure and/or project. Since all of these entrepreneurs were forced to repay loans
without the income from the associated enterprise, however, I have classified all these outcomes as business failures.
Even in light of their high incidence, cases of outright business failure are the extreme.
My interviews revealed that a far greater share of borrowers -- 55% percent (n=23) --
experienced significant repayments problems at some point in time. While some of these
Table 4.7
Causes of Business Failure
Cause Primary Reason for Failure Status Type of Business
L .oanK pyrtdrid t oubtal Out 0ft*:,ns*""ovrDr oossop&cfee
Loa Reae Loan paymentsdralndall theempltalout of the business ge.ri Dry goodshc
Needed More Training New Venture Soft famising mir. & drapery
Poor Mangment New Venutre Pig farm
Business Related Regulatory Enviroment Changed New Venture Mobile peanut carts
(n=5) Marketing Problemns 19cvering 8outique
Lost Lease ExadigCafe & snackbar
Illness New Venture Dry goods shop & cafeteria
Non-Business Family Crisis New Venture Pig farm
Related Family Crisis Recovering Dry goods shop
(n=4) Gone to US Expandina Garment construction
businesses have reconciled their problems and have either successfully completed or are about to
complete paying off their loans, their albeit temporary struggle with their debts is a potential
indicator that the loans may not have had a net positive effect on the businesses in the short- , if
not the long-run. Table 4.8 lists the primary (there were often many) reasons why these
borrowers ran into trouble making their agreed upon installments and it explains how they
eventually managed to repay the funds. In 5 of the 7 cases of repossession of household items,
the items were sold and the proceeds applied to the outstanding loan balance. Because this rarely
worked out to a significant amount however, most applicants were forced to repay the loan from
another income source such as getting another job or using their spouse's income. In only 4
cases (17%) were the businesses eventually able to absorb the arrears and pay off the loan. Aside
from the diversity of sources entrepreneurs drew on to service their debts, the other piece of data
worth commenting on the is rate of repayment by guarantors. While every loan
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loan, neither FUNDAID nor the borrowers seem to have any idea how often guarantors actually
service loans and how large their net contribution to the overall repayment pool might be. I was
only able to verify 3 cases where guarantors had made payments but I strongly suspect that there
are more, mainly because such a large share of borrowers do encounter trouble meeting their
repayment schedules and FUNDAID rigorously pursues guarantors, resorting to legal action if
necessary, as soon as a borrower is late with even a single payment.5
Even if half the entrepreneurs sampled could repay their loans with little or no
difficulty, that doesn't necessarily mean these enterprises are profitable. In fact, my very rough
estimates of enterprise profitability based on a combination of factors covered in my survey6
suggest that just under half of the enterprises surveyed are turning a profit,7 and the profit is
extremely small in most cases. Table 4.9 shows the estimated profitability of the businesses in
the sample by stage of business development. Only 32% of the sample consisted of business
with active loans that were turning a profit after paying their loan installment. When combined
with the 17% of profitable businesses who had already repaid their loans, this brings the total
share of businesses that were turning a profit at the time of the interviews to 49%. More
interesting than the profitability figures, however, are the loss figures. The fact that only 21% of
expanding operations, as opposed to 41% of new ventures and 50% of recovering operations are
5 FUNDAID's rigorous pursuit of guarantors in cases where borrowers are late with payments is mainly designed to
induce guarantors to pressure delinquent borrowers into making payments. When this tactic fails to make the
borrowers address the problem within a reasonable amount of time, however, FUNDAID immediately seeks to
collect from the guarantors, resorting to legal action when necessary.
6 1 considered several factors including gross sales, monthlv business expenses, loan installment size, salary, and
percent of household income derivedfrom assisted business to determine the estimated profitability of a given
business. The survey question asking if enterprise income had changed since taking the loan tended to produce
unreliable responses. I suspect that respondents felt obliged to say that their income had increased unless it
undeniably had not.
As described earlier in this chapter, I defined the break-even point as the point at which gross income equals gross
expenditure, where loan installments and employee salaries are included in gross expenditure but the primary
entrepreneur's salary is not. For enterprises that are still making loan payments, I estimated both present profitability
and projected future profitability after the loan is paid off; for paid off loans, I only estimated present profitability.
not and/or will not be profitable suggests that the benefits associated with credit tend to increase
with the age and stability of the borrowing enterprise.
Table 4.9
Estimated Profitability of Enterprises
(by Repayment Status and Stage of Business Development)
0
0 o.
S 0
0.0
co eratin at rofit 1su0% 2% 2% 2% 17%
PAID OFF 0 eratin at break-even level - - 2% - 2%
E eratin at a rofit -profit will increase after re a ment 17% 2% 5% 7% 32%
Oeeratinm at break-even -will make rofit after resampment 7% - 5% - 12%
ACTIVE O eratin at that au h after reparment 2% - 2% - 5%
O Deratina at loss - will break-even after repayment- - - - -
147% 15%1 29%1 20%1 100%
*Row and column totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.
Even if an enterprise is not profitable in the sense of consistently taking in more than it
expends, it may be profitable during certain periods, or it may simply serve to diversify the
entrepreneurs' sources of income and/or increase his/her assets. Almost all of the operating
enterprises surveyed claimed to be affected by widely fluctuating or seasonal income patterns.
This, combined with the fact that about half the entrepreneurs didn't keep written financial
records, accounts for the respondents' inability to estimate their income levels. Nevertheless,
these entrepreneurs must have been gaining some benefit from their businesses, otherwise they
wouldn't be running them. In the next chapter, I will discuss the ways in which the
entrepreneurs, their households, employees and the wider community may have benefited from
the operation of these businesses.
In light of the fact that the majority of entrepreneurs sampled appeared to have an
established cash flow shortage and fairly pressing needs to make what appear to be rational
investments in their businesses, their decisions to take business loans do appear to be well
founded. Nevertheless, the fact that 15% of the loans were delinquent, 29% of the businesses
had closed down, and a full 56% of borrowers had encountered difficulties repaying the loans
suggests that the loans may not be having as positive an overall effect of the assisted enterprises
as one might like. The final test to determine whether the entrepreneurs felt the loans had
benefited them was to ask them directly, "if you had it to do all over again, would you take the
loan again?" A striking 66% (n=27) respondents reported that they would take the loan again!
The fact that 5 of the respondents who said they would take the loan again had enterprises that
were no longer in operation is very telling. Two of the five have paid almost no money back and
have experienced very little adverse impact from borrowing and failing to repay. The other 3 are
respondents who have invested in assets (2 sewing machines and a construction loan) and hope
one day to use the assets to re-establish their enterprises. Another 2 of those reporting they
would take the loans again are people who had trouble repaying the loans but feel that once they
are paid off, they will be able to make successes of their enterprises. In fact, one of the
borrowers is a community activist in a very remote, poor community who had been trying in vain
to get credit to start a farming business for years. Although his business had not yet turned a
profit and he had extreme difficulty earning enough cash to service his loan, he was so delighted
to have been able to finally get a loan that FUNDAID had really changed his outlook on the
world and opened him to the possibility that he might be able to take part in "the system" after
all. Only one of those with a successful enterprise reported that he would not take the loan again.
He was a very successful agriculturalist who has primarily relied on the Agricultural
Development Bank for credit, and he found FUNDAID's fees to be exceedingly high in
comparison. An additional 5 people with struggling enterprises said they would not take the loan
again because they had extreme difficulty repaying the loans or they didn't like owing people.
While a healthy share of respondents would have taken their FUNDAID loans again if
they had it to do all over again, a much smaller share (40%) indicated they would consider taking
future loans from FUNDAID and only a few could name specific projects that they wished to
finance with the loans. Many people indicated that they didn't wish to borrow again because
they "don't want to owe anybody." Others said they wouldn't go back to FUNDAID because the
interest and fees were too high, particularly the $1,000 mandatory accounting fee (a service
which most people did not make use of). Twelve respondents mentioned future projects they
might like to finance. Of these, roughly a third involved purchasing new equipment, a third
involved purchasing business vehicles, and a third involved constructing or obtaining new
facilities.
By evaluating several of the variables discussed in this chapter simultaneously, it is
possible to group similar outcomes and rank them according to the impact of the loans on the
assisted enterprises. As seen in Table 4.10, I have selected business failures, willingness to
repeat the decision to take the FUNDAID loan, repayment problems, enterprise profitability, and
loan status and as the key variables involved in assessing the overall impact of the FUNDAID
loans on the assisted enterprises. When grouped and ranked according to these variables in the
order listed, the data reveal that in 54% of the cases (n=22), the loans appear to have had a
generally positive impact on the assisted enterprises.
Table 4.10
Summary of Outcome Variables
for Evaluating the Impact of FUNDAID Loans on the Assisted Enterprises
E
O 0
CM h-.I
T EFUN S
Positive
Outcome
(n=22)
Parlor Y N Y Proft PAD OFF
Ima e consultant Y N Y Profit <1 Month in Arrears
Hair salon Y N Y Profit <1 Month in Arrears
Pu'a sho Hindu ceremonial su les Y N Y Break-even PAID OFF
Leather craft manufacture Y N N Break-even 1-3 Months in Arrears
Po corn machine for. arior Y N Y Loss 1-3 Months In Arrears
Negative GofttuIdnshln a mrnrand dra a desl n N V N/A 1-3 Months in Arrears
Outcome Minimart N Y NIA 1-3 Months in Arrears
(n=1 9) Pig farm N V V N/A >$ Months in Arrears
Chapter V.
Assessing the Benefits of Entrepreneurial Activity
at the Individual, Household, and Community Levels
I have established that FUNDAID loans helped about half the enterprises in my sample,
with unclear or negative results in the other half of the cases. Because the point of assisting
enterprises is to assist the owners, their families, and their communities achieve a better quality
of life, however, it is necessary to look beyond the effects on the enterprises and examine how
the assisted enterprises affected these people. The following chapter will discuss the role the
assisted entrepreneurial activity played in the borrowers' work lives in terms of both the quantity
and quality of employment and income-generation. It will also examine what share of household
income was generated by the assisted enterprises and how entrepreneurial activity fit together
with the entrepreneurs' other employment and domestic responsibilities. Finally, this chapter
will explore what broader impacts the assisted enterprises may have had at the community level,
in terms of employment generation, the provision of services to the local community, and broader
economic linkages.
While small business development is often touted for its ability to create employment,
microenterprises are by definition very small operations that rarely employ anyone other than the
entrepreneur him/herself. In many cases, entrepreneurs can not even support themselves through
their entrepreneurial activity alone and they are forced to combine their business activity with
jobs in the formal labor market. In some cases, entrepreneurs prefer small business activity to
paid work in the formal labor market and they hope to one day quit their paid jobs and run their
businesses full-time. In other cases, entrepreneurial activity can act as a source of supplementary
income, diversifying an individual or a family's sources of income in order to spread the risk of
having one or more income source(s) dry up. In still other cases, as many of its main proponents
argue, entrepreneurial activity can provide opportunities for employment when none might
otherwise exist due to a lack of jobs in the formal labor market, a skills mismatch, locational
constraints, lack of social ties necessary to secure paid jobs, or domestic or physical constraints
that might prevent certain social groups from obtaining paid work in the formal labor market. It
turns out that I found evidence to support all of these theories among the group of FUNDAID
borrowers I interviewed. In order to be able to make some generalizations about which of these
trends were most prevalent, however, I found it helpful to examine a number of key variables:
earnings rates, the percent of household-income provided by the assisted businesses, other
sources of household income, the number of hours worked, whether the entrepreneurs held other
jobs or ran other enterprises, and other factors that may have affected the various entrepreneurs'
vocational choices.
The main way in which microenterprise development programs aim to improve the lives
of the clients is by assisting them to create employment -- that is, opportunities to generate
income. Entrepreneurial activity is seen as a powerful vehicle in this respect because it not only
makes work where it might not have existed otherwise, but it is thought to have the capacity to
create sufficient levels of employment and income-generation to lift people out of poverty. All
too often, however, running a microenterprise requires long hours of work that generate little,
and in some cases no income. As a result, entrepreneurs often must combine this work with
other jobs and/or business activity. As seen in Table 5.1, a full 65% (n=19) of the entrepreneurs
with active businesses' had no other source of personal earned income aside from the assisted
enterprise. Twenty-nine percent (n=9), however, combined their entrepreneurial activity with a
paid job in the formal labor force, and almost half of these also ran an additional business. A
final 3% had only other entrepreneurial income.
Table 5.1
Hours Per Week Worked by the Primary Entrepreneur in the Assisted Enterprise:
Active Business Only (n=29)
(by Access to Other Sources of Personal Earned Income)
Almost a third of the entrepreneurs sampled combined their entrepreneurial activity with
a paid job in the formal labor force. These cases tended to take two forms: people who held full-
time jobs (n=4) which supported them and enabled them to reinvest the majority of their
entrepreneurial profits into the business as a means of cultivating a long-term investment; and
people who held part-time jobs (n=5) that tended to supplement their entrepreneurial income -
By "active businesses" I am referring to businesses that were in operation at the time of my interviews (January,
1997). Since I interviewed a total of 41 businesses and 12 were not in operation at the time of the interviews, the
figures given in this section are taken as a fraction of 29. the total number of "active businesses.
o0 C\%i 0
O- CJ V 10%
Other job FT - no other business - 3% 7% 10%
Other job PT - no other business - 13% 3% 6%
No other job - no other business 48%14 3% 65%
Other job FT & other business - - 3% 3%
Other job PT & other business 3% 7% - 10%
No other job but other business 3% - - 3%
TOTAL 54% 27% 16% 97%
* Row and column totals do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.
not vice versa as in the case of people with full-time jobs. Since I will discuss the practice of
developing a small business as a long-term investment later in this chapter, I will focus here on
the people who live off their entrepreneurial income and supplement it with income from a part-
time job. In two out of five of the cases where respondents combined part-time jobs with their
entrepreneurial activity, the jobs were closely related to their business activity. For example, the
woman who ran the pre-school also drew a salary from SERVOL's educational training program
because she trained SERVOL student teachers in her school. Similarly, the Amway distributor
also sold insurance on commission and she was able to combine these 2 activities as she went
from house to house on sales calls. Two other cases involved very poor people who occasionally
got temporary work through the national Unemployment Relief Program.2 The final case was a
shoe repair man who also ran a construction business.
In addition to combining paid jobs in the formal labor market with their entrepreneurial
activity, 16% (n=5) of the entrepreneurs sampled also ran other businesses. These businesses
tended to serve very different functions for the respective entrepreneurs. In one case, a sheep
farmer took a FUNDAID loan to buy sheep, but as they had not yet matured enough to go to
market, the entrepreneur was forced to find another means of servicing his FUNDAID loan and
supporting himself and his wife. Since he lived in a very poor, remote area and he did not have
any formal job options to speak of (except URP which is by definition a temporary job), he
farmed vegetables and sold them in the local market. In another case, the second venture was
somewhat dormant. This case involved an upper-class restaurateur who had started her
entrepreneurial career off by producing and distributing a line of popular cheese dips. While she
2 The Unemployment Relief Program (URP) is a national anti-poverty program which employs the poor for short
spells (usually about 17 days at a time, once or twice a year) in public works projects to help them amass a small
amount of cash.
had to put the dip business aside while she got her new seafood restaurant off the ground, she
hoped to run both businesses simultaneously in the near future. In a third case, the second
business was also dormant but, unlike the cheese dip business, it was mainly due to a lack of
demand for the service. The Amway distributor who also sold insurance, as it turns out, also ran
a typing business. As she indicated that business had been slow on the typing front lately,
however, she was largely channeling her efforts into developing the Amway business and the
insurance sales job. The two other cases of entrepreneurs who ran multiple businesses are very
interesting. One was a West African who had permanently migrated to Trinidad where he
worked full-time as an engineering instructor in the SERVOL vocational youth training program.
His first business was a fabric shop in the cruise ship complex that primarily targeted tourists
coming off the cruise ships. In the course of running that shop he realized that the workers in the
building had nowhere to purchase snacks and drinks, so he started a snack shop in a kiosk in the
same building. While he didn't draw a salary from either business, he indicated that both
businesses were doing very well and he intended to keep reinvesting 100% of the profits from
both until he retired from his teaching job so as to ensure the continued growth of his
investments. The final case involved a shoe repairman who had learned the trade from his father
who had been in the business for more than 40 years. While the son had worked full-time for an
appliance repair company for most of his adult life, all the while doing shoe repair on the side to
generate extra income, he had recently been laid off so he took a loan to expand the shoe
business. It turns out, however, that his fellow was a very entrepreneurial chap! In addition to
the shoe business, he was also running his own informal construction company which got jobs
now and then, and he had managed to talk the appliance repair company that laid him off into
giving him part-time work on a contract basis. This is perhaps the best illustration of
diversification of personal sources of earned income in my study.
While two-thirds of the primary entrepreneurs had no other source of personal earned
income, only half (n=16) were employed full-time (40+ hours per week) in the assisted enterprise
(many shop keepers actually worked up to 70 or 80 hours per week). The other half of the
respondents were employed only part-time, two-thirds of which (n= 8) worked 20-40 hours per
week in the assisted enterprise, and a third (n=5), less than 20 hours per week. While working
more than 20 but less than 40 hours per week may be an indication of under-employment, it turns
out that half (n=4) the people in that category had other jobs and/or businesses (which I discussed
earlier in the section on people combining part-time jobs with entrepreneurial activity) and 3/4 of
the others had essentially chosen not to work more hours. Two of these cases were dependents in
others' households who took a somewhat leisurely approach to their work. One woman, a
seamstress, readily admitted that her business could be doing a lot better if she would only put in
a little more effort, but to date she has been unwilling or unable to do so. Another woman
reported wanting to limit her work hours because she also had to tend to domestic duties, and her
husband's income from a part-time job made it possible for her to work less than full-time. The
one case where an entrepreneur in this category wanted to work more but wasn't able to because
of a lack of demand for his goods was a single man with no dependents who ran a struggling
parlor. Because he lacked the capital to expand his line of goods beyond very basic items such as
bubble-gum, candy, soft-drinks, chips, and newspapers, his market was more or less limited to
the children who attended the 2 schools nearby. While he took a FUNDAID loan to increase his
stock, the high installments caused his business to shut-down and he was only able to pay off the
loan and reopen his parlor with the help of his elderly mother who sent him some money to bail
him out.
Three (3) of the 5 respondents working less than 20 hours per week had other full-time
jobs and they were simply developing their enterprises as a long-term investment, hoping one day
to retire from or quit their paid jobs and go to work in their enterprises full-time. In the mean
time, however, all 3 hired people to staff their enterprises. One of the others working less than
20 hours per week was a young man living in his mother's household who ran a lawn care
business to earn independent income. When asked why he did not work more hours, he replied
that working out in the hot sun mowing lawns was too physically draining to work any more than
4 hours a day. The last case of an entrepreneur working lest than 20 hours per week involved a
very poor, rural woman with 10 children (only 5 of whom were in her care at the time of the
interview) who had a mobile food business selling boiled corn and canned soda at occasional
sporting events. While she may have liked to work more often, she was limited by the number of
large events at the nearby stadiums. a factor that was far beyond either her or FUNDAID's
control.
More important than how long they worked and whether they had other jobs and/or
businesses may be how much the entrepreneurs earned from these businesses. Because few
entrepreneurs took regular salaries and many didn't even keep business funds separate from
personal funds, however, I was only able to get actual income figures from 7 active businesses.
These figures ranged from $200 - $2,000 per month take-home pay, with an average of $1,125
per month (see Table 5.2). Not only do these figures generally fall above the poverty line of
$623 per month, but all but one of these entrepreneurs had other sources of income (either
earned, unearned, or both).
The best earnings estimate I could get from the whole set of informants, however, was
the estimated percent of household income derived from the assisted enterprise. For this figure
to be useful. though, it is first necessary to understand the structure of the households. As seen in
Table 5.3, just under 69% of the primary entrepreneurs running active businesses were heads of
household. The number of dependents in these households ranged from 0 to 5 with an average of
2.5 dependents per household. The assisted enterprise served as the primary income source for
the household in 35% (n=7) of these cases, serving as the sole source of income in 14% of the
cases (n=4). Two of these enterprises, a furniture manufacturing company and a vegetable farm,
were able to support entire families very well. In the other 2 cases, a family of 4 with an auto-
body straightening shop and a single middle-aged man (no dependents) with a very small parlor
were struggling to get by because the enterprises were only marginally profitable.
Table 5.2
Monthly Take-Home Salaries
TYPE OF BUSINESS MONTHLY SALARY
Parlor $200
Seamstress & mfr. soft furnishings $450
Hair salon $700
Hair salon $1,000
Shoe repair and fabrication $1,400
Lawn care $3,000
Average Salary $1,125
Table 5.3
Percent of Household Income Provided by the Assisted Business
and Other Sources of Household Income
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entrepreneurs all being males who earned less or had less stable incomes than their wives)
followed by the either the entrepreneurs' or their spouses' pension or disability payments, and in
one case, an entrepreneur's other part time job.
The final 30% of the enterprises run by heads of households provided very little, if any
income at all. In 4 of those 6 cases, the entrepreneurs had other full-time jobs and 3 were
consciously reinvesting all business profits to expand the business as an investment for the
future. The fourth was the case of the caretaker who was running a parlor in the SERVOL
training center (even though it was not making a profit) because he "wanted to serve the kids."
He mainly lived off the salary he earned as a caretaker for the school. The fifth case where the
assisted business contributed little or no income to the entrepreneur's household involved a
woman who worked full-time at a profitable dry goods shop, but she was able to reinvest all the
profits because her husband worked as a police officer and he earned a handsome salary. The
final case where an assisted enterprise contributed little or no income to the entrepreneur's
household was the case of the sheep farmer whose sheep had not yet matured enough to go to
market so he was not yet making any profit from the venture.
Businesses run by people who were dependents in others' households tended to
contribute less to the entrepreneur's total household income and they tended to be managed more
casually than businesses run by heads of households. Since most of these businesses' main
purpose was to supplement the primary income-earner's contribution to the household expenses
(n=6), and in some cases to provide a source of independent income for the entrepreneur (n=3),
there was not as much of a pressing need for these businesses to be profitable. In fact, in 3 cases,
the puja shop, the leather craftsman, and a hair salon, the entrepreneurs really were supported by
other members of their households and the businesses, seen more as hobbies, were only
marginally profitable.
The fact that a third of the active businesses contributed little or nothing to the
entrepreneurs' household income and almost half contributed only supplementary income should
be viewed in light of a number of factors. As discussed earlier, several of the businesses that
contributed little to household income were profitable but the entrepreneurs chose to reinvest the
profits in the business as an investment for the future. In a few other cases, the businesses may
become more profitable over time. The sheep farm is one example. Another is a hot dog cart run
by a man and his wife who both worked at full-time paid jobs in the formal sector. While they
currently hire someone to run the cart every now and then, the salary costs cut into their profits
and they will be able to make far more money when they have more time themselves to devote to
the business. Finally, most of the businesses, and many of the loans, involved building assets or
fixed investments such as facilities, machinery, equipment, etc... Because these assets can be
liquidated in the event of a financial crisis, they provide a type of insurance against future
hardships. Thus, the assisted enterprises should not only be evaluated on the basis of their
potential for income-generating but also for asset-building.3
Finally, the value of business activity to the respective entrepreneur should be evaluated
in light of the individual's alternative occupational choices. Some of the strongest arguments on
behalf of microenterprise development focus on the idea that many people face barriers -
geography, skills, age, race, physical constraints, domestic responsibilities, etc.. - that prevent
3 When viewed in light of the type of assets acquired (buildings, equipment, etc.) and the weak resale market for
these goods, however, the asset-building argument may be more convincing on a psychological as opposed to a
financial basis.
them from obtaining jobs in the formal labor force. As seen in Table 5.4, many of the
entrepreneurs I interviewed faced just these types of barriers, and in many cases,
starting their own enterprises proved to be a good solution to their particular problems. For
instance, 13% of the enterprises (n=5) were run by people who were dependents in other peoples'
households as a means of generating an independent source of income. These cases tended to
fall into two categories: adult children who still lived with their parents who wished to generate
their own disposable income, and wives who wished to have a source of income that would not
be subject to their husbands' control. This is often said to be particularly true of women in
traditional Indian families in Trinidad, as their husbands tend to afford them very little
independence, financially or otherwise. One Indian woman told me that her sewing business not
only enabled her to combine her work with her domestic duties and obtain some personal income
that was not subject to her husband's control, but she was able to earn her husband's respect by
making a significant financial contribution to the family's efforts to add an extension onto its
house. Wives and mothers of young children are not the only ones who might benefit from
working out of the home. I also saw a case where an entrepreneur's husband was severely ill
with acute diabetes, and it was only because she established a home-based business that she was
able to earn an income while still being home to care for him. There were also 2 cases where the
entrepreneurs themselves were ill or handicapped which would have made it extremely difficult
for them to find work in the formal labor market. One man had a severely deformed hand would
have had difficulty market yet he was able to be productive, generate
Table 5.4
Occupational Needs Filled by Assisted Businesses
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income, and provide a service to his performing many jobs in the formal labor community by
establishing his own minimart. The other case of illness amongst the entrepreneurs themselves
was an older women with rheumatoid arthritis which severely limited her mobility, yet she was
still able to keep busy (although she generated little income) by running a puja shop out of a
room she had added onto her kitchen with the help of a FUNDAID loan.
Some of the respondents indicated that their entrepreneurial activity was valuable because
it provided more stability than jobs in the formal labor market. This was true of three
respondents who had been laid off and were unable to find other work. Two retirees remarked
that there simply were no alternate employment opportunities available to people of their age, yet
they still needed income to maintain themselves.4 Finally, five respondents, who tended to be
among the poorest in the sample, were more or less structurally unemployed due to the fact that
they lived in very poor, remote locations and/or they lacked the education, skills, and social ties
necessary to obtain jobs in the formal labor market. For this group the, albeit limited, income
generated through entrepreneurial activity can prove essential.
People belonging to the groups just described -- people pursuing entrepreneurial activity
to gain an independent source of income, because they needed to work in the home, because they
were ill, handicapped, or retired, -- tend to fall into the two-thirds of the sample with no other
source of personal earned income. The structurally unemployed, on the other hand, tend to get
URP work every now and then (classified as a PT job), and some even pursue other income-
generating activities (classified as other businesses). It is interesting to note, however, that nearly
4 Because Trinidad is a highly unionized country, they developed a national pension system fairly early on. Most
retirees from full-time formal sector jobs receive a retirement pension, yet people commonly complain that it is not
enough to live off of. The few people in may sample who received N.I.S pension received approximately $330 per
month which falls far below the national poverty line which stands at $623 per month.
half the people classified in these groups have enterprises which are no longer in operation. This
may be a function of the fact that these are "make-work" jobs as opposed to serious businesses
which are designed to meet an existing market demand. When viewed in light of the fact that
many of the businesses started by people in these groups -- and many of the businesses that failed
-- were minimarts or dry goods shops which have very low barriers to entry and are marked by
stiff competition and low profit margins, this argument may be reasonable. If indeed this is the
case, however, it doesn't necessarily mean that people with these kinds of special occupational
need should necessarily avoid starting their own enterprises. On the contrary, entrepreneurial
activity may be the only way these people can earn an income while accommodating their special
needs: they just need to chose sectors where there is a demonstrated market demand and where
they have some competitive advantage in the marketplace.
My final criteria for evaluating the impact of the assisted entrepreneurial activity on the
respective entrepreneurs is the way in which the entrepreneurs themselves professed to feel about
their work. When asked whether they would make more money working in a formal paid job or
working for themselves, just over half the respondents (n=21) replied that they either did or
would eventually make more money working for themselves (of those, 3 of the businesses had
closed). Six replied that they either did or would make less money working for themselves (of
those, 2 of the businesses had closed). Six respondents replied that they had no alternative but to
work for themselves (half of those businesses had closed). Two simply saw self-employment as
a long-term investment and not an-ongoing employment opportunity (1 of these businesses had
closed), and 2 said they simply liked it better than working for someone else. Four respondents
did not answer the question (3 of those businesses had closed).
When asked whether they were satisfied with their businesses, 72% of entrepreneurs with
active businesses (n=21) replied that they were satisfied. Only 28% of entrepreneurs with active
businesses (n=8) responded that they were not satisfied with their business. When combined
with the fact that 12 businesses failed, just over half the respondents in the full sample were
satisfied with their businesses.
It is worth noting that several entrepreneurs saw business ownership as more than a
means of generating income. For these people, business ownership was a personal goal. They
remarked that it was challenging and rewarding in a way that working for someone else can not
be. Several people reported gaining self confidence and "people-skills" as a result of their
entrepreneurial activity. Many voiced pride in the quality of their workmanship and customer
service orientation. Two entrepreneurs, the school teacher and the SERVOL custodian who ran
the unprofitable minimart to "serve the kids," remarked that running their businesses was a way
of helping others. Others saw entrepreneurship as a goal or lifestyle that they wanted to achieve.
Many expressed a desire to have "a nice little shop" one day. Promoting pride in ownership -- in
building something by one's self for one's self and one's family -- was undoubtedly a chief
benefit of the FUNDAID program and the enterprises it assisted.
While the vast majority of the benefits of the assisted entrepreneurial activity accrue to
the entrepreneurs themselves, there may also be some broader social benefits. I was surprised to
find that nearly half of the active businesses had non-family or paid family employees. (See
Table 5.5.) Taken together, these 14 businesses "employed" a total of 34 people, nearly half of
which were employed in the restaurant which was really a medium enterprise that used
FUNDAID for a bridge loan to supplement a much larger commercial bank loan. Nevertheless
this enterprise accounted for 13 regular paid non-family jobs in the community and 1 paid family
job. The only other full-time jobs were provided by two entrepreneurs who themselves had other
full-time jobs so they hired people to run their businesses. One of these jobs was provided by the
West African who ran the snack shop in the cruise ship complex. He hired a girl to staff the shop
full-time. The other 3 jobs were created by a young single man who worked full-time as a
security guard in a government building and ran a food shack on the side. He hired three people
full-time, a chef, a prep-cook and sales girl, to run his restaurant. He would staff the shop at
night and do the shopping on the weekend. The remainder of the jobs (16 jobs) were either part
time or temporary, often described as "apprenticeships" or "training opportunities" paying very
little.
Aside from providing jobs and income for the entrepreneurs and occasionally their family
members and people in the community, the assisted enterprises also provided valuable services to
the surrounding communities. While some of the services such as boutiques, leather craft
(mainly targeting the souvenir market), and image consulting can hardly be described as
"essential," others such as agricultural production, pre-school education and food outlets clearly
make important contributions to people's lives. This argument is particularly strong for the 19%
of businesses serving local and regional markets in rural area, and those businesses serving
underprivileged communities in urban areas - which often lack key services. (See Table 5.6.)5
Table 5.6
Markets Served by Existing Businesses
0 0
0U 0
_J r z
Mobile 6% 6% 3% 15%
Urban 19% 19% 6% 44%
Rural 13% 6% 13% 32%
38% 31% 22% 91%
Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding errors.
As nearly all of the assisted enterprises purchased their inputs from major national wholesale and
retail stores, however, there were few backwards economic multipliers that would accrue to other
local businesses. Likewise, most of the assisted entrepreneurs sold directly to the public so there
were few forward multipliers. Although the wages paid to the enterprises' 34 employees tended
5 As mentioned in Chapter 2, I have lumped all mobile businesses, whether rural or urban, into a single "mobile"
category, and divided the remaining non-mobile businesses into rural and urban categories.
to be fairly low, the potential for consumption linkages spurred as those people spent that income
in their communities is perhaps the strongest multiplier effect spurred by these enterprises. On
the whole, the entrepreneurs themselves tended to benefit far more from the assisted
entrepreneurial activity than did the surrounding community.
In an effort to summarize the overall effects of the loans on the enterprises, and the
enterprises on the entrepreneurs, their household and the surrounding communities, I combined a
number of key variables covered in this chapter and the one directly preceding it. After
experimenting with various ways of grouping and raking the cases according to these
variables, a pattern began to emerge. The same cases continued to show up in the same areas of
the rankings, regardless of how I ranked the variables. Table 5.7 shows the results of my efforts
to summarize both phases of my evaluation. The variables have been ranked hierarchically with
the left-most columns taking the highest priority. It turns out, though, that the 3 variables on far
right. which also prove to be very important, tend to align very closely with those in the left-most
group. Thus, I have categorized the 41 cases in 5 groups, with the most successful outcomes at
the top and the least successful, being outright business failures, at the bottom. Although I have
classified 5 cases of enterprises that contribute little or nothing to household income as
successful cases, it should be noted that 4 of the 5 cases are successful enterprises where 100%
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of the profits are being reinvested for the future and the fifth case will finish paying its loan soon,
after which it will become much more profitable. After carefully re-evaluating each case on last
time, I was able to confirm that the classified outcomes accurately reflect the way the cases
appeared to me, and in the vast majority of the cases, the ways the entrepreneurs reportedly
viewed their own entrepreneurial experiences.
Conclusions & Recommendations
My analysis of the socio-economic impact of FUNDAID loans and the assisted
entrepreneurial activity reveals that just over half the cases resulted in positive outcomes. This is
a far cry from the 99% repayment rate and the 93% share of non-delinquent loans in the active
portfolio that FUNDAID published in its October 1996 performance indicators. The most
obvious lesson here is that repayment rates alone do not provide sufficient information with
which to evaluate the effectiveness of microcredit programs. By looking at a much broader array
of variables at the enterprise, individual, household and community levels, it is not only possible
to get a much more accurate picture of the socio-economic impact of a credit program, but it is
also possible to develop some insight into the factors that distinguish successful outcomes from
unsuccessful outcomes.' Perhaps the most important reason to pursue a broader, more integrated
approach to impact analysis, however, is to gather the type of information necessary to
effectively evaluate and improve upon program design.
After identifying a number of key performance variables and using them to classify the 41
cases in my sample into groups of successful and unsuccessful outcomes (as seen in Table 5.6 in
the preceding chapter), I was able to investigate several potential predictor variables to see
whether they had any relationship to outcomes. While some of my findings were not particularly
surprising and others may not have been pronounced enough to draw any major conclusions
(perhaps because my sample size was so small), I was still able to come up with some useful
Throughout this section I will refer to "*successful" and "unsuccessful" cases. I am using these terms in a holistic
sense, referring both to the impact of the loan as well as the broader social impact of the entrepreneurial activity.
Since these two measures tended to overlap (as seen in Tables 4.10 and 5.7), I have decided to use a single all-
encompassing measure (Table 5.7) to classify both types of outcomes.
information about the ways in which successful cases differed from unsuccessful cases. This
information, along with feedback from the respondents about specific aspects of FUNDAID's
program, serve as the basis for several recommendations that I will make.2 As these
recommendations will directly emerge from the factors that I have determined to be the most
critical in determining the outcomes of specific cases, they may have the potential to maximize
FUNDAID program's positive socio-economic impact.
The first variable that appears to be related to case outcomes is a firm's stage of
development in its overall life-cycle. Not surprisingly, I found that established firms seeking
loans to expand their operations had a higher success rate than new ventures or recovering
operations. While almost two-thirds of expanding operations were classified as successful cases,
only half of recovering operations and one-third of new ventures were ultimately classified as
successful. Interestingly enough, both of the firms that took loans to maintain their current level
of operations were classified as successful, but the high success rate in this category may have
had as much to do with the fact that there were only 2 such cases in the sample as with the
inherently "safe" nature of this type of borrowing.
The sector in which a firm operates also affects its chances of success. Almost three-
quarters of service firms, as opposed to only half the manufacturing firms and 44% of retail
firms, were classified as successful. A meager quarter of the agricultural firms were classified as
successful, but as there were only 4 cases of agricultural businesses in my sample, these
outcomes may not be representative of agricultural businesses in general. As the Agricultural
Development Bank has a credit program targeted at the small and micro agricultural enterprises,
and it clearly has technical superiority in evaluating the risk of this type of loan, I would
2 The following information is contained in tabular form in Appendix 4.
recommend that FUNDAID refrain from lending to agricultural ventures, referring these clients,
instead, to the ADB.
Case outcomes did not seem to differ significantly according to the location of a business
(rural vs. urban) or the market served (local, regional, national). I did, however, observe that 5
out of 6 (83%) mobile businesses were classified as successful. While the one mobile business
that did fail (a peanut cart in a major urban area) failed due to changes in the regulatory
environment that could potentially affect other mobile businesses, a closer look at the case is
warranted. It turns out that this business was unable to maintain operations because the
particular area in which it operated had been swarmed with new mobile vending businesses and
police had taken to regularly sweeping the area free of vendors. Since 3 of the other 4 mobile
businesses were not conducted from the side-walk, however, the risk may have more to do with
conducting business in a public space than the mobility aspect of the business. 3
Personal characteristics of the primary entrepreneur also proved to be somewhat useful in
predicting case outcomes. Surprisingly, young people (less than 30 years old) and people over 50
had a higher success rate than those in their 30's and 40's. While it is conventionally thought
that young people tend to lack the education and experience to be successful in running their own
businesses, young people in Trinidad tend to be better educated than older people in Trinidad
because the education system has vastly improved since the oil boom in the early 1970's. In fact,
respondents in their 20's not only tend to have attended school one to two years longer than their
older counterparts, but they tend to have had more training (i.e. formal courses, apprenticeships
and related jobs) than their older counterparts who often had learned their trades from families --
3 The 3 mobile businesses that did not conduct business of the sidewalks were a door-to-door Amway distributor, a
lawn care venture, and a mobile haberdasher who went door-to-door offering items for sale out of her van.
if they had any training at all. Entrepreneurs with no training tended to be slightly more likely to
fail in business than those trained via courses, related jobs, or family. The 3 respondents who
had learned their trades via apprenticeship (a hairdresser, a furniture-maker, and an auto-body
worker), on the other hand, all were classified as successful. Two of these 3 people were under
30. Since the only 2 respondents under 25 had no training and one was classified as a failure,
however, education and training may be more valuable predictors of outcome than age.
Curiously, household headship and gender also appear to be related to outcome. While
60% of the primary entrepreneurs who were heads of household were classified as successful,
only 41 % of non-household heads were successful. Success rates for male heads of household
were much higher than that of female heads of household -- 70% as opposed to 50% -- but there
were twice as many male heads of households. In fact, males in general tended to have a slightly
higher success rate (60%) than females (48%). It is interesting to note that they also have a
higher probability of having received work-place training either through apprenticeship or related
work experience: women are more likely to have been trained via short courses (sewing. hair-
styling). The other factor that may help explain the gender differential is the higher likelihood
for women to run retail establishments and men to run service establishments. Since service
establishments achieve success at nearly twice the rate of retail establishments, that might help
account for the fact that enterprises run by males tend to succeed more often.
It also appears that success rates increased with the number of hours worked in the
business. While entrepreneurs working 40+ hours per week had a success rate of 81 %, those
working only 20-40 hours per week saw only a 50% success rate. The 5 entrepreneurs who
worked less than 20 hours per week, however, were all successful. Three out of 5 of these
entrepreneurs had other full-time jobs and looked at their enterprises as a long-term investment.
The other two were the lawn care man who preferred not to work more than 20 hours per week
due to the taxing physical nature of the work and a very poor single mother who sold boiled corn
and soft drinks at national stadium events. Since her costs were fairly low and the mark-up on
her products was fairly high, she would generally turn a profit, and although the income was
unsteady, her entrepreneurial activity certainly helped her cash flow.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, only about half of those pursuing entrepreneurial
activity to meet specific occupational needs were successful. In fact, exactly half of the retired,
laid-off. and those who needed to work at home while caring for children or sick dependents
were classified as successful. Both of the entrepreneurs who were sick or handicapped were
classified as failures (but the causes of their business problems were unrelated to their physical
problems). Finally, only 20% of the people undertaking entrepreneurial activity to address
problems associated with long-term unemployment succeeded. Since there were so few of all of
these types of cases. however, it is likely that sample bias has as much to do with my findings as
the "make-work" argument discussed in the previous chapter.
The final factor that appeared to be related to case outcomes was the question of whether
the borrowers really could have accessed credit elsewhere had they wanted to. Not surprisingly,
the 24% of borrowers who reported going to FUNDAID solely because they preferred a small
business oriented program, there was too much "red tape" at banks, and/or they thought they
could get better terms at FUNDAID achieved a much higher success rate than the share of
respondents who reported being unable to get credit elsewhere. While those who did not fall into
the credit gap achieved a 70% success rate, those who did only achieved a 48% success rate.
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Taken together, these indicators suggest that established enterprises run by well-educated
males who did not have any specific occupational needs and did not fall into the credit gap -- that
is, the relatively more privileged segment of FUNDAID's clients, tended to perform better than
their less privileged counterparts. Since FUNDAID is designed to serve the poor, however, and
because this very segment of FUNDAID's clientele is the one which is the least in need of its
services, it would make little sense to pursue a strategy of lending to these individuals just to
improve the program's success rate.4 Nevertheless, one has to question whether it makes sense
to pursue lending to more disadvantaged groups when they are ultimately forced to make
significant sacrifices such as borrowing from "last resort" family members, finding other jobs,
and/or having household items repossessed and sold simply to pay off the loans to finance
ventures that ultimately fail.5 The question then becomes how can programs like FUNDAID
pursue lending to disadvantaged groups in such a way as to make the enterprises, and not just the
loans, work?
I was unable to come up with concrete findings regarding sample-bias and whether FUNDAID serves the poorest of
the poor. I am of the opinion that FUNDAID's strict lending criteria (which I will discuss later in this section) tend
to screen out the less capable and motivated borrowers, so I believe that I would have found sample bias had I been
able to compare success rates among FUNDAID clients with success rates among unassisted entrepreneurs. With
regards to the question of whether FUNDAID serves the poorest of the poor, I found mixed results. There were a
few clear examples of extremely poor borrowers, but there were also a few examples of extremely wealthy
borrowers. Because Trinidad tends to be a fairly unregulated society with fairly good basic social redistribution
mechanisms (education, health, etc.), there is a very large middle -class, and it is extremely difficult to determine
one's social class unless he/she is either very rich or very poor. For this reason, I was not able to develop any
conclusive findings on the question of whether FUNDAID serves the poorest of the poor.
5 While I found that entrepreneurs were almost always distraught about business failures, there were some cases that
I classified as negative outcomes where the entrepreneur was admittedly unhappy about the outcome, but may not
necessarily have wanted to have avoided the experience altogether. Business failures can be a valuable learning
experience, and because entrepreneurs can undertake business activity for such a wide variety of (occasionally
conflicting) reasons, one must be careful about assuming that all negative outcomes could or should be prevented.
In fact, one could argue that a lending program is being too conservative if it never has a failed businesses. I am
simply arguing that unnecessary and excessive failures should be avoided when possible because failure does carry a
heavy penalty for those who must find another means of generating income to pay a debt for a failed business.
There are two possible ways to go about increasing microcredit programs' success rates.
One is to improve the screening process so as to screen out loans to enterprises that are doomed
to failure, and the other is to work to improve the enterprises' chances of success by
accompanying the credit with training and technical assistance. While FUNDAID admittedly
already does both, judging by the results of my evaluation of program impact, their efforts in both
of these areas could stand to be improved.
As far as screening goes, performance measures for loan officers seem to play a key role
in shaping screening decisions. Loan officers are currently required to maintain an active
portfolio of 125 loans and make a minimum of 5 loans per month. Because they receive a
financial incentive to exceed these targets, however, they have little reason to be very stringent in
their screening efforts. While they also receive a financial incentive for having a low
delinquency rate in their portfolio, that simply encourages them to be aggressive in their
collection efforts rather than selecting enterprises that will succeed and be able to make their
payments with little or no effort on the part of the loan officers. Indeed, my research shows that
the enterprise failure rate far exceeds the delinquency rate; the unfortunate borrowers simply
have to be creative about coming up with ways to repay the loans for their failed ventures.
Any effort to change the incentives in the screening process should be viewed in light of
the broader issues affecting the demand for FUNDAID's services. FUNDAID cites the fact that
its loan officers saw a total of 1,957 people in 1986 yet it issued only 383 loans, as evidence of
the fact that demand exceeds supply. What happened to the other 80% of the applicants? One
staff member told me that FUNDAID rarely turns down applicants who can meet all the
requirements, so it is very likely that the other 80% either couldn't get 3 cosigners, they couldn't
get all the legal documentation (invoices, land titles, permits, etc.) necessary, or they didn't like
the terms. Indeed, I spoke to informal entrepreneurs in the rural areas of Trinidad who would
have liked to get FUNDAID loans but were unable to find 3 people who met the income
requirements to cosign the loans. In light of the fact that both the management and the loan
officers were constantly trying to issue new loans, it seems unlikely that they wouldn't have
chosen to make loans to more than 20% of the total walk-in applicants if they could have.
This issue begs the question of whether the lending requirements shouldn't be relaxed,
rather than tightened, if FUNDAID really wants to serve the poorest of the poor. Indeed, its
requirements are fairly stringent in comparison with conventional microlending standards.
Perhaps FUNDAID, or even another program.6 ought to consider ways to address this residual
barrier to gaining credit by experimenting with other, more flexible means of securitizing loans
to the poorest of the poor. A peer lending model that starts with very small sums and gradually
works its way up once all members of the group have repaid their initial loans may be one way to
make credit more accessible. While there may be some initial resistance to the peer cooperation
model at first, it may be possible to ease this tension by working through pre-existing community
or church groups in the towns and villages, or to draw on the existing sou-sou networks by
infusing the system with a new source of capital. Another way to induce people to cooperate
might be to try and organize peer groups around specific trades (such as street vending, leather
6 FUNDAID really is a minimalist credit program that happens to throw in a little training and technical assistance on
the side. The design of its operations and lending criteria are drawn from a commercial banking model, and most of
its staff, including its loan officers and General Manager, are formal commercial bankers. For these reasons, there is
some question whether it makes sense for FUNDAID to try and expand beyond this model and move into more
innovative ways of extending credit to the poor. As there is a thick network of community-based social service
agencies in Trinidad, it may make more sense to assist one of these agencies to implement another type of credit
model and/or to establish a new organization altogether. FUNDAID clearly provides a valuable service to about half
its clients, but it clearly needs to expend some energy improving its current model, and maybe having some
competition that uses a different model will give FUNDAID an incentive to improve its overall socio-economic
impact.
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working, etc.) and to couple the credit program with sector-specific training and technical
assistance and/or cooperative services such as bulk purchasing of inputs or cooperative
marketing efforts. If this idea were taken to the extreme, it might take the form of a micro-
business incubator, where FUNDAID would purchase a building, say in the market district of
downtown Port of Spain, and rent it out to microentrepreneurs wishing to take part in its on-site
comprehensive business service program which might include credit, regular technical assistance,
and/or cooperative services.
The business incubator concept brings up another innovative financing tool that may
extend beyond FUNDAID's mandate but would provide a good complement to FUNDAID's
existing services as part of a broader effort to extend a full range of financing services to
Trinidad's population of microentrepreneurs. Venture capital has often been associated with
high-technology firms in the US, but its focus on equity rather than debt financing may help
programs like FUNDAID look beyond the short-term goal of meeting donor's benchmarks for
financial sustainability. In various parts of the rural US, community-based organizations have
been experimenting with community buy-outs of for-profit firms which are then used as a
training ground for budding entrepreneurs and a source of financing for future entrepreneurial
development, as the profits of these successful businesses are used to capitalize equity
investments in new firms.7 While the use of this type of financing in an employment-generation
context is too new to have reaped any direct profits through the remittance of dividends from the
assisted enterprises, it might be possible to extract some type of dividend from successful
borrowers over the long-term if the investor runs an incubator and monitors and assists the
tenants with their record-keeping and financial management.
7 Berl n, Gordon. Job Creation and Business Development. Unpublished draft.
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While these kinds of efforts may help to make capital more accessible to a broader range
of applicants and they would eventually increase the pool of qualified candidates which is a
necessary precondition to improving the screening side of the lending operations, in the
meantime, it is necessary to do something about the high failure rates among the limited number
of clients who are able to make it through FUNDAID's rigorous screening process. This brings
me to the issue of training and technical assistance, services which FUNDAID already offers but
in a somewhat limited form. While FUNDAID's 2 day training session which covers the basics
of costing, pricing, marketing, and record-keeping is a good start, many respondents reported that
it covered too much too quickly and they would have liked to have had more time to cover the
material in greater depth. A key strength of the program was the fact that the trainers used
examples from each participant's own business which helped to make the training more relevant
for the participants. As the technical officers were to follow-up on the training by providing one-
on-one on-site technical assistance after the loans were issued, the model appeared to be sound.
In practice, however, fewer than half the respondents actually kept up with their record-keeping.
and many reported never having been visited by a technical officer in the field. I would venture
to guess that even the new fleet of 4 young technical officers will not make a significant impact
on business survival rates because they are neither allowed nor equipped to provide enough in-
depth concrete accounting and marketing assistance to make a difference in any individual
business.
There is no getting around the fact that providing quality technical assistance to
struggling microenterprises is expensive and time-consuming. While this tends to conflict with
the financial sustainability mandate of many service providers, the up-side is that it promotes
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long-term human capital development among low-income clientele which, after all, should be
one of the end goals of the process of microenterprise development. Several of the borrowers I
spoke to reported gaining self-confidence and viewing themselves in a new light as a result of
their interactions with FUNDAID's trainer and other group members. Why then does FUNDAID
refrain from advising clients about their business ideas for fear of "talking down to the poor?"
On the contrary, FUNDAID should view its training and technical assistance efforts as an
opportunity to lift up the clients by helping them to build marketable ideas, solid management
skills, and sound businesses that they can be proud of.
As the majority of business failures and/or problems encountered in repaying loans in my
sample could be attributed to business-related, and often management-related causes, FUNDAID
should intensify its efforts to ensure that borrowers have the necessary skills to plan and manage
their enterprises effectively. Perhaps the best way to do this is to require that applicants do a
little more homework before they take out a loan. One model for assisting applicants to
undertake a more detailed evaluation of their business prospects before taking a loan would be to
require all potential applicants to take the FUNDAID training session before their loan is
approved. If, in the context of the training session, and with the support of the trainers and their
peers, the applicants are required to submit detailed sales records for existing businesses and
projected sales plans for new ventures, it will be possible to get much more accurate cash flow
projections upon which to base the loan repayment schedules. This, in turn, might help alleviate
the problems associated to the loan-related failures and/or problems encountered in repaying
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loans which are largely but not entirely limited to high-turn-over, low mark-up retail
establishments such as minimarts and dry good shops.8
In order to maximize the benefits of the training session, FUNDAID should expand the
number of days from 2 to 4 or even 5, experimenting with different sequences of days off in
between so as to minimize the cumulative impact of the travel burden and the general anxiety
associated with attending a class. FUNDAID might also want to consider giving these sessions
in locations that are more convenient to the rural borrowers if they have a critical mass of people
who do not come from Port-of-Spain. The required exercises could go beyond the current
record-keeping exercises to include "homework" which might involve counting the number of
competing establishment within a 30 minute walk of one's business and/or visiting competing
establishments and making note of their range of goods/services, prices, and the number of
clientele in the establishment at the time of the visit. They could include more elaborate costing
exercises than are currently pursued, and they could involve some practice with various methods
of inventory management. since many of the borrowers I spoke to didn't have a sense of their
profit or their inventory levels. Finally, an expanded training session could probe deeper into the
question of marketing to try and determine how large entrepreneurs' current markets are and
generate some constructive ideas as to how they could expand their markets. Since the current
training sessions tend to be largely devoted to going through a single costing and pricing exercise
for one item from each participants' business, the marketing component often gets swept under
' Because high-volume, low-mark-up retail establishments are subject to extreme variation in income levels, a
carefully planned and exceeding flexible repayment schedule can make or break such ventures. FUNDAID is clearly
aware of the problems it has with "stock" loans for retail operations, yet it has responded by being less rather than
more flexible in structuring these loans. Perhaps gaining more detailed information about the actual cash flow in this
type of enterprise through the proposed pre-loan training session will help FUNDAID to come up with a more
creative way to work-out a feasible repayment schedule for this particularly vulnerable type of borrower.
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the rug, yet the lack of a strong customer base seemed to be among the chief complaints of
struggling businesses.
There would be both benefits and drawbacks associated with requiring attendance at an
extended training session prior to making decisions as to who will get loans. The chief benefit is
that the exercises and homework will assist FUNDAID to gather the necessary information to do
a more comprehensive evaluation of the business plan, and it will enable FUNDAID to gauge the
applicant's commitment to his/her business idea as well as his/her capacity to carry out that idea.
Indeed, the training officer told me that she could often project which entrepreneurs would
succeed and which would fail after the 2 day training session (and it turns out she was often
right!), yet as it currently stands, her valuable inputs comes after applicants have been approved
for loans, and only in rare cases does FUNDAID reverse a lending decision as a result of the
training officer's input. By requiring applicants to attend training as part of the application
process, it would harness the power of the training officer's insight and it would help the
applicants develop a better understanding of what's involved in running a successful business.
The chief drawback of putting all applicants through a training before deciding upon their
loan application is the cost associated with training. While FUNDAID currently covers the cost
of the training session by charging borrowers $150 which it adds into their loan and remits to
FUNDAID upon disbursal of the loan, it would be hard to convince clients to pay for the training
up front if they are not guaranteed to get a loan at the end. One way to deal with this might be to
allow successful applicants to continue to add the cost of the training into the loan after they have
completed the session, and set up a fund to assist unsuccessful applicants cover the cost of the
training. Since the goal of the training will be to get every applicant through the process with a
108
fundable "business plan," it would only be the minority of candidates who would not qualify.
The fund could be capitalized through grant funding under a national training program, donor
funding, or by charging a slightly higher training fee to those who do receive loans. There is an
argument to be made for subsidizing the people who do not actually get loans in the end, because
otherwise the cost of training would serve as an exorbitant application fee for a service they may
not ever get (never mind the fact that it would be hard to collect from them up front.) In order to
prevent people from abusing the system to receive free training, FUNDAID might try charging a
nominal entrance fee each day. It could also give placement exams/assignments to allow the
more skilled applicants to place out of the training altogether if they have the skills to be able to
produce all the necessary costing, pricing and market information without the help of the course.
FUNDAID's follow-up technical assistance should also play a key role in helping
entrepreneurs to improve their chances of success. If it is to do this, however, FUNDAID needs
to stop viewing its staff of technical officers as credit officers whose only role is to stop in for a
brief visit to ensure that the borrower is doing what he/she said he/she was going to do with the
money. Instead, the technical officers need to be given the time and flexibility to give each
borrower the individual attention and tailored services that he/she needs. To do so, FUNDAID
will first have to hire officers who are skilled and experienced in business management. When
asked whether he had benefited at all from a recent visit from one of the new university-educated
technical officers, one respondent told me, "of course not... she would have had to know
something about my line of work to tell me something that I didn't already know." Instead of
hiring young university graduates, FUNDAID might be better off to hire older people who may
not have a university education (which ultimately may only serve as a social barrier between the
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educated technical officers and their largely uneducated clients) but who has real-life business
experience.9 Perhaps FUNDAID could work with the SBDC's Interface program which draws
on a national network of professionals, university graduates, and retirees to pair borrowers with
personal business advisors. Even if FUNDAID did hire older, more experienced technical
officers, it would also need to relax its requirement for the number of clients assisted per day and
the maximum amount of time spent per borrower. Because the borrowers in programs like
FUNDAID are inevitably going to have varying levels of need for different types of assistance, it
only makes sense to maximize the impact of a limited technical staff by concentrating on the
borrowers that most need help. This way, it might be possible to spread a limited amount of
technical assistance across the maximum number of borrowers by concentrating efforts on those
who really want and need help. This would not serve to raise the average minimum human
capital level, but it may also actually make a difference in those few businesses that really need
the help, possibly even preventing unnecessary business failures.
Improved training and technical assistance would not only prevent FUNDAID from being
labeled "just another bank" (as many respondents actually described the program to me), but it
might help better educate the borrowers about their rights and responsibilities with regards to
credit. While FUNDAID does take steps to educate borrowers about their obligations, many
respondents felt FUNDAID lacked credibility because they charged exorbitant fees which were
not disclosed to the borrower until very late in the process. Aside from the lack of training and
technical assistance, the number one complaint voiced by respondents, and chief among the
In Trinidad, as in many cultures, older people may also have difficulty taking advice from their juniors. Technical
officers should not only be older and more experienced in business, but they should be familiar with strategies and
local resources for solving problems related to advertising, marketing, procurement, registering a business, book-
keeping/accounting, collecting accounts receivable, customer service, production processes, etc..
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reasons why many would not borrow from FUNDAID again, was the mandatory $1,000/year
accounting fee. Because very few respondents actually kept their books daily and sent their
records in to FUNDAID's accountant, many did not even benefit from the service. Even those
that did complained that the formal computer-generated balance sheets that they did receive were
useless because they were either incomplete (usually due to incomplete record-keeping on the
client's part) or the client couldn't understand them and didn't know how to go about using them
to get a loan from a commercial bank (which was the intended purpose of the service to begin
with). In fact, only one borrower that I interviewed had actually gone on to "graduate" to a
commercial bank loan, but he had made other arrangements for his accounting, as this service
was not yet mandatory when he took his loan in early 1994. Some of the more educated
borrowers kept their own records and they resented having to pay a fee for nothing (2 people I
interviewed were even former accounts clerks!). Others had friends or family with accounting
skills who they would have preferred to trust with their record-keeping. If FUNDAID wants to
improve its repeat lending activity and recover its institutional integrity, I unquestionably
recommend that it dispense with the mandatory accounting fee and offer an optional accounting
service that would be performed through the technical officers as a cooperative educational
experience for the borrower.
Several informants also remarked on the high staff turn-over rates, complaining that they
could not keep up with who was in charge of their account which made it difficult for them to
establish a good rapport with FUNDAID. Several clients complained that it took weeks for their
completed applications to be processed because their loan officer had gone on vacation and no
one else had picked up the file. One client even complained that he had negotiated an informal
repayment schedule to clear up an arrears but when his loan officer went on vacation, another
officer picked up the case and called to pressure his guarantors, unaware of the fact that he had
already made an arrangement with his regular loan officer! Clearly, FUNDAID needs to improve
the coordination of work-flow amongst its office staff.
The most important lesson from this evaluation, however, is that FUNDAID must
reorient its focus away from loans that perform toward enterprises and clients that perform.' 0
While repayment rates may be the bottom-line if financial sustainability is the goal, it is possible
to move beyond the financial bottom-line to a broader, more holistic social bottom- line based
not only onfinancial sustainability at the program level, but also on the creation and/or support
of successful businesses and entrepreneurs. FUNDAID's creative use of the guarantor system to
make credit available to those who might not otherwise have access to it should be applauded,
but reliance on guarantors should not be allowed to supersede the more pressing goal of helping
enterprises succeed. For this reason, FUNDAID should reevaluate its performance standards for
loan (and technical) officers, linking financial incentive not to repayrnent rates, but to business
success rates. To do this, FUNDAID will need to develop the capacity to monitor outcomes over
the long-term. If it were to simply monitor when payments were made by guarantors rather than
borrowers, and when client enterprises have shut down, however, it could have at least a
rudimentary measure of enterprise survival. When coupled with in-depth on-site technical
assistance for the enterprises most in need, these indicators would provide the basic framework
10 The fact that FUNDAID's staff is drawn from the commercial baking world may serve a s a significant barrier to
moving beyond the financial bottom-line to the social bottom-line. Perhaps it would make more sense to hire credit
officers and management with more of a human service or business management background, as opposed to a
banking background. After all, the work of a credit officer generally does not involve much in the way of technical
skills - just basic math and calculating interest rates. Nonetheless, the fact that the organization currently is based on
a commercial banking model may ultimately serve as a formidable barrier to the organization's ability to serve social
as well as financial goals.
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for a more effective impact monitoring system. Once in place, this system could serve as an
invaluable tool with which to evaluate the program's overall socio-economic impact and improve
what emerge to be the salient issues in program design and effectiveness.
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Appendix A
FUNDAID's Cumulative Performance Statistics (updated monthly)
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3 Aserave Loan Size
4 No of Loans Repaid
; \alure of Loans Repaid
0 Loans h Gelogap ic
X8%
- TIT6.838.116.34
- TI$ 7.631.83
- 1 I $3.075.'00 78
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(ast - 32 81)
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C 0"111"\ (Icmndl
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IS - 25 Years
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31 - 50 Years
5 1 and Oser
Sen'1 ice & Trade
NlIan u factunring/Iiiin dst r
Retail & Distribution
Agro & Agri-businiess
Cost Per Job Created
Indirect Beneficiar ies
Delinquienc' Rate ()(o day s & O\ er)
Number of Loans Written Off
\'alte of I oans Wr itten Off
$3923 19(rcpa\ able)
5138
6 77%
5
$2. 793.27
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12 09"6
3 26"o
46 27
43 73%(
(17%
18%
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3 1 0l,
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20%
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Appendix B
Survey Instrument
(Data to be Pulled From Files Prior To Interview -- This Page Only)
Name:
Address:
Phone:
Type of Business: _
Date & Time of Interview:
Borrower:
Gender(s):
Individual
Married couple
Unmarried couple
Platonic partnership
Same sex partnership
Siblings
__ M
__ F
MF
MM
FF
Race(s):
Loan I
Indian
___ African
Chinese
__ Caucasian
__ (Other)
Loan 2
Loan date
Loan amount
Loan purpose
Loan up to date (Y/N)
Number Days in Arrears
Date Loan Rescheduled
Date Loan Paid Off
New venture? Yes No
Age of business at time of loan application (in years):
Loan 3
__
01. Why did you decide to start your own business?
02. How did you learn your trade/skill?
03. What are/were your parents' occupations?
mother father
04. What is the highest level of school you completed? (C=completed level, P=partially completed)
- primary (standard I-IV)
___ junior sec (Form I-III, 14+ exam)
__ senior sec (Form IV, V - O-Levels, VI - A Levels)
__ college (high school form I-IV)
__ university
05. Have you ever owned a business before? Yes No
If. so what type?
For how many years?
06. How did you hear about FUNDAID?
___ media (radio, newspaper)
relative
__ neighbor
_ school or vocational training program
other
07. Did you know anyone who received a FUNDAID loan before you did? (enter the number of people)
relative
_ neighbor
classmate
co-worker
__ other (specify)
08. Did you know anyone who worked for FUNDAID at the time you applied for you loan(s)? Who?
name:
09. What is the name of the loan officer that assisted you with your application?
name:
10. How long after your first visit to FUNDAID did you have to wait until you received the check(s)?
How many times have you visited their office?
11. Did you receive any training from FUNDAID?
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How much? hours
What kind?
Do you use any of the skills you learned? Which ones?
12. Have you had any contact with FUNDAID since you received your loan? What for?
field visit from technical officer
telephone call from loan officer regarding late payments
__ field visit from loan officer to investigate a default
___ other (specify)
13. Where do you get the money necessary to run your business?
Ever used Since FUNDAID loan
Informal sources:
friends and relatives
sou-sous
private moneylenders
suppliers
advances from customers
Formal sources:
credit cards
commercial banks
NGO's (including FUNDAID)
government institutions
Other sources:
savings/assets
14. Did you try to get a loan from a commercial bank before you went to FUNDAID? Yes No
If not, why not'?
If so, did you get through?
If not, why were you turned down?
If so, why did you decide to borrow from FUNDAID?
15. How much money did you borrow from FUNDAID? $
At what interest rate? %
How long were you given to pay it back? months
What is your monthly payment? $ /month
Did FUNDAID charge any fees that were added into the total amount you borrowed? How much
and for what?
16. How did you use the loan funds?
For assisted business:
raw materials/supplies S %7C
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machinery/equipment $ %
leasehold improvements $ %
labor $ %
For other business $ %
For household $ %
For savings $ %
Other (specify) $ %
17. Is your business still in operation? Yes No
If not, why not?
___ lost key contract (why)
__ not enough customers
__ sudden business related expense (specify)
__ family crisis (specify)
__ family wanted something they couldn't buy on credit (specify)
wanted to change type of business (to what and why)
__ took another job (specify and explain why)
didn't like the kind of work
__. other (specify)
18. Are you currently up to date on your loan payments? Yes No
If not, why ?
If so. have you ever been in arrears? Yes No
If so. describe why and how you solved the problem.
19. Have you seen any change in your business income since you took the loan?
increased
decreased
__ no change
If so, why?
__ increased capacity utilization
_ increased productivity (i.e. through process or technology changes)
__ cut material costs through bulk purchases
___ increased volume of production
__ increased volume of sales due to marketing investments
improved product quality
___ new products (specify)
__ other (specify)
20. What is the average number of customers you serve each week?
Just before loan Today
21. What is the average value of your sales per week?
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Just before loan ST
22. Where is your businesses housed?
___ within dwelling, shared space
___ within dwelling, separate
__ exterior building with other units
_ exterior in own building
mobile
23. What is your land tenure situation?
own property
__ rent property
occupy property free of charge with permission
__ squat
24. Do you buy your materials and supplies from people:
__ in the neighborhood
___ in the village
in the nearest town
city (specify)
abroad
25. Where do the majority of your customers come from:
in the neighborhood
___ in the village
in the nearest town
city (specify)
abroad
26. Do you keep business funds separate from personal funds?
27. Do you have a bank account? Yes No
personal
business
combined
28. Do you keep business records? Yes No
If so, may I see them?
29. Name the key products that you produce or sell and what fraction of your business earnings they
account for:
_________ (7c
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Today S
30. How much does your main product/service sell for (price/unit)? $ /
31. How do you determine the price of your goods?
competition
___ cost of producing them + mark-up
__ suggested by suppliers
___ other (specify)
32. How are sales made?
directly to customers
_ to shops
to wholesale merchants
___ to exporters
___ other (specify)
33. Do you sell on credit? Yes No
If so, is it a problem to get customers to pay? Yes No
34. How many units of your primary product do you sell per month?
35. How much does it cost you to produce one unit of this good (direct costs)?
S materials and supplies
S labor
36. How much per month on average do you pay for indirect costs associated with your business?
S rent and/or building maintenance
S utilities
S equipment purchase
S equipment maintenance
S raw materials and supplies
S_ _ hired labor
S your salary
S_ _ taxes, licenses, fees
S_ _loan repayment
37. Is your sales income higher in some months than others? Yes No
Which months are high, medium and low earnings months?
High Medium Low
January
February
March
April
May
June
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July
August
September
October
November
December
What is the total value of your sales in an average high-income month? $
What is the total value of your sales in an average med-income month? $
What is the total value of your sales in an average low-income month? $
38. How many people does your business employ?
Today Before loan
Owner
full time
part time
seasonal
Family Workers (irregular wages or unpaid)
full time
men
women
part time
men
women
seasonal
men
women
Paid Employees
men
women
part time
men
women
seasonal
men
women
39. What is the average hourly wage you pay your employees?
Just before loan $_
40. What is your age?
41. Are you married? Yes No
42. Are you the head of your household? Yes No
43. Who controls the income earned from your business?
respondent
spouse
pooled
combination
44. Do you pay yourself a fixed salary from the business? Yes No
Today $
If so, how much and how often? $ per
If not, what is the average amount of funds (cash and in-kind) that you extract from the business for
personal use each week? S per week
45. Do you have any other businesses? Yes No
What kind?
46. Do you have any other paid employment? Yes No
What kind?
How much does it pay?
47. How many hours per week do you work?
Just before loan Today
In assisted business
In other business
At other paid jobs
Housework
48. What fraction of your household income comes from your business?
Just before loan ( Today
49. How does the money you earn now compare with what you think you could have earned had you looked for
alternatives to running your own business?
More Less About the Same Don't Know
50. Do you currently receive income from:
rental property
government transfers
family in other places (i.e. abroad)
51. List the members of your household (i.e. people who you share food with) and their current occupations:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Relationship: Age: Occupation:
Number of dependent children:
52. What are your 2 largest household expenses?
%_ rent/housing
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%7_; food
_ 7( education
__% transportation
___ medical
__% debt (specify)
____% remittances paid out (specify)
% taxes
53. Have you learned any new skills as a result of your business activity?
What skills?
Why/how did you learn them?
54. If you had it to do over again, would you take the FUNDAID loan(s) again?
If yes, do you intend to take future loans from FUNDAID? Yes No
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Appendix C
Variables Contained in Master Database
A NAME name of borrower(s) 99 GUARPAY amount repaid by guarantor&
1 ADDRESS addse of borrower(s) SC REPO data t: reposeeean (if any)
C BUSTYPE busmiess type 0 SBDCCLAIM amount repaid by SBDC guarante
D NEWVEN now venture? BE HOWREPAY whem dyou get m. moneytorepay the loan
E AGEATAPP aeof venture atappheten BF CURRUTD a you currently up to dte on your len payments
, MARRIED? borrower(s) mamaed SG AMTARR amount i amree, when A how much wee your ieat payment
G GENDER gender of borrower(s) H PASTARR have you been naiim n m the p"
H RACE race of bonrower(s) 1 HOWFIX how id you n y peel mrnea
RUR/URB busiess locaton? BJ INCCHGE hiasyourom neh eagden ou"y Mi loa n
j #LOANS 0 of loans received by enterpnae BK WHY why hae yourm o mohanged
K LOANDATE dateloen(a)misued L #CUST/WK #of oustomers perweek
L LOANAMT amount of loan(s) BM #SALES/WK gros sales per wek
M MOINC/OFF monthly income estimated by loan officer ON HOUSED wher is your tbuinen housd
N MOEXP/OFF monthly expnses estimated by loan officer So TENURE land tenu austion
o MOSUR/OFF monthly surplus estmated by loan officer OP SUPPSOURCE where do you buy your aupples
p BASELOAN base loan amount (before fas a interest) 9O CUSTORIG where do your cuetomr* come from
o ADMINFEE admiristrative fe* BR FUNDSSEP do you keep busmness funds esparate from personal funds
R TRFEE tranng Joe BS BANKACCT do you have a bank account
S ACCTFEE accounting lee ST COMB/SEP do you have separate bank acts for business and personal funds
T LEGALFEE legal fee su RECORDS do you keep busines records
U OTHERFEE other fee (usuany a guarantee fee BV KEYPROD what are your key products
v %TOFA 6 by which base loan had to be increased to cover tees OW HOWPRICE how do you determine how much to charge for a given product
W INTRATE interest rate BX SALESMETH sates method (wholesale, retai, etc)
x LIFE(MOS) life of loan (in months, BY SELLCREDIT do you seli on credt
y INTOVERLIFE total mieres! over life of oar 9Z PROBCOLL do you have problems collecting payment
z MNTHLYPYT monthly payment CA BUSEXP/MO business expenses per month
AA WHYSTART why did you stMart your business CO HIGHVOLMO high volume months
AB HOWLEARN how did you learn your trace CC EMPLOYE ist everyon. who works in the busness <age sex. fami'
AC PAROCC parents' occupation CD EMPLWAGE employee wages
AD SCHOOL at what age did you last attend schoo CE BAGEATAPP borrower(s) age at application
AE OCCHIST occupational history CF MARRIED are you mamned
AF PREVBUS previous businesses CG HHHEAD are you head of household
AG HEARFA how did you hear about FUNDAID CH CONTROL who controls the income from the business
Am KNEWEMPL Oid you know any FUNDAID employees Cl FIXEDSAL do you pay yourself a fixed salary
At LOANOFF who is your loan officer CJ OTHERBUS do you have any other businesses
Aj WAIT length of wat between initial application & disbursement of funds CK OTHERJOB do you have any other pobs
A OFFVISITS number of times you have visited FUNDAID's office CL HOURS/WK how many hours per week do you work per ob
AL TR comments re: FUNDAID taining CM %INCBUS what % household income comes from te asssted business
AM FIELDVISITS have you been visted by a FUNDAID officer aince you got the loan CN SEBETTER 0 een-employment better tan working for someone eIse
AN $SOURCES astll sourceas of business finance CO OTHERINC othersouroea of household income (rental property, etc.)
AO COMMBANK idyou approach a commercial bank before gomg to FUNDAID CP HHMEMBERS houshold m bers
Ap WHYNOT not CO HHEXP/MO household apenan per month
A0 AMTBORR amount borrowed (as you remember it) CA NEWSKILLS hav You teamed any new sfk om your business eae"y
AR FAFEES comments re: FUNDAID tesn SA TISFIED are you eaelld with how your businea a performing
AS COMMREFA general comments re: FUNDAID CT FUTPLANS what are you future plan for your busines
AT GUAR who did you get for guarantors CU LOANAGAIN if you had it to do over, would you ake the loan again
AU HARDFIND were they hard to fimd CV FUTLOANS do you plan to take any future loans
AV BORDIR why ddn' you borrow e S directly from guarantors CW COMMENTS macelaneous comments
AW USES how did you use the loan S CX PROJENT nomindted for Progect Enterpnise competition?
A WHYBORR why did you have to borrow o fimance this CY SAMP sample (onginal vs. supplementary)
AY BUSSINOP is the business sl in operation CZ COMPADV comparalve advantage of the business
AZ WHYNOT i't not, why not DA PROBLEMS problems with the bus.nen
amount borrower repaidBA JAMTBORPD
Appendix D
Potential Predictors of Success
STAGE
NV MO RO EO
S 4 2 4 12 22
F 8 0 4 7 19
12 2 8 19 41
33% 17% 50% 63%
SECTOR
AGR MFR RET SVS
S 1 3 7 11 229
F 193 3 9 4
4 6 16 15 41
25% 50% 44% 73%
OTHER JOBIBUSINESS
(ACTIVE BUS ONLY-MULT CLASS)
NONE FT PT BUS
S 15 3 4 4 26
F 1 5 1 1 1 8
20 4 5 5 34
75% 75% 80% 80%
% SUCCESS
% SUCCESS
% SUCCESS
% SUCCESS
% SUCCESS
HH HEAD
Y N
S 16 6 22
F 9 10 19
25 16 41
64% 38%
LOCATION
RUR URB MOB
S 17 10 5 22
F 9 9 1 19
16 19 6 41
44% 53% 83%
MKT
L R N
S 10 8 4 22
F 19 5 5 19
19 13 9 41
53% 62% 44%
EMPLOYEES
(ACTVE BUS ONLY)
Y N
S 12 10 22
F 10 7 17
12 17 29
100% 59%
AGE OF PRI ENT
20'S 30'S 40'S 50'S 60'S
S 6 7 5 3 1 22
F 3 7 8 1 0 19
9 14 13 4 1 41
67% 50% 38% 75% 100%
OCC NEEDS
HOME ILL RET LOFFINEMP
S1 3 0 1 1 1 8
F 3 2 1 1 4 9
6 2 2 2 5 17
50% 0% 50% 50% 20% 47%
PYT STAT
PAID UTD <1 1..3 3+
S 6 4 6 5 1 22
F 3 0 4 7 5 19
9 4 10 12 6 41
67% 100% 60% 42% 17%
HRS1WEEK
(ACTVE BUS ONLY)
40+ 20-40 <20
S 13 4 5 22
F 3 4 0 7
16 8 5 29
81% 50% 100%
% HH INC
MAJ SUPP LIT
S 6 111 22
F 11 2 4 7
7 13 9 29
86% 85% 56%
HOW LEARN
APP JOB COU FAM NO
S 3 2 5 6 6 22
F 0 2 5 5 7 19
3 4 10 11 13 41
100% 50% 50% 55% 46%
% SUCCESS
% SUCCESS
17-25
FEMALE HH HEADS
F M
S 12 14 16
F 4 5 9
6 19 25
33% 74%
GENDER OF PRI ENT
M F
S 112- 10 22
F 8 11 119
20 21 41
60% 48%
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